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THE  BASIC  PROBLEM  OF  AGGREGATE  economic policy is often posed as 
"the cruel choice between two evils, unemployment and inflation."' Al- 
though informed policy decisions depend on an accurate assessment of the 
relative social costs of the two evils in the short run and long run, the wel- 
fare economics of inflation has received far more attention in economic 
analysis than the welfare economics of unemployment.2  Most previous dis- 
cussions of the latter have been partial and impressionistic  catalogues of the 
economic and psychological effects of unemployment which make no at- 
tempt to analyze cyclical unemployment within the conceptual framework 
of labor supply theory or to provide quantitative estimates of its welfare 
cost.3 And  yet any policy decision to  induce a temporary recession by 
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1. James  Tobin and Leonard  Ross, "Living  with Inflation,"  The  New York  Review  of 
Books, Vol. 16 (May 6, 1971), p. 23. 
2. A concise statement  on the welfare  economics  of fully anticipated  inflation  and a 
bibliography  of previous  contributions  is contained in Edward  Tower, "More on the 
Welfare  Cost of Inflationary  Finance,"  Journal  of Money, Credit  and Banking,  Vol. 3 
(November 1971), pp. 850-60. A more extended  treatment  is contained  in Edmund  S. 
Phelps,  Inflation  Policy and Unemployment  Theory:  The  Cost-Benefit  Approach  to Mone- 
tary  Planning  (Norton, 1972), Chaps. 5 and 6. 
3. No attempt  will be made  here  systematically  to summarize  previous  contributions. 
Among the relevant  references  are  A. R. Dobell and Y. C. Ho, "An Optimal  Unemploy- 
ment Rate," Quarterly  Journal  of Economics,  Vol. 81 (November 1967), pp. 675-83; 
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monetary and fiscal policy in order to moderate inflationary  pressure,  as in 
1968-69, requires a judgment on the social cost  of the resulting loss  in 
employment and output. 
Recent statements on the welfare cost of the cyclical increase in unem- 
ployment during the 1969-70 recession have been extremely casual. One 
approach has been to calculate the "Okun's law" loss in aggregate output 
that is statistically associated with a given short-run increase in the unem- 
ployment rate.4 An example is my comment that the cost of the 1969-70 
recession, as compared with an alternative policy that would have main- 
tained unemployment at  a steady 3.8 percent, was  $100 billion in lost 
output.5 A quite different but equally casual approach, which ignores the 
output loss associated with a higher unemployment rate and tends to mini- 
mize the welfare  cost of the extra  unemployment  itself, is Milton Friedman's 
analysis of the effects of an increase in the aggregate unemployment rate 
from 3.5 to 4.5 percent: "In fact, the number who each week start to look 
for work would be raised very little-from  530,000 to perhaps 560,000. But 
these  job-seekers would spend on the average an extra week or so finding an 
acceptable  job....  The most serious effect would be to raise the number of 
persons unemployed at any time for more than six months from 180,000 to 
perhaps 300,OO0."6 
This paper attempts to assess the social cost of a I percentage point in- 
crease in the aggregate unemployment rate caused by restrictive  monetary 
and fiscal policy (as opposed, for instance, to an increase caused by a shift 
in the demographic, occupational, or geographic structure of labor supply 
Tibor and Anne A. Scitovsky, "Inflation  Versus Unemployment:  An Examination  of 
Their Effects," in Commission  on Money and Credit, Inflation,  Growth,  and Employ- 
ment  (Prentice-Hall,  1964), pp. 429-70; and Phelps, Inflation  Policy, Chap. 4. 
4. For the original  statement,  see Arthur M. Okun, "Potential  GNP: Its Measure- 
ment and Significance,"  in American  Statistical  Association,  Proceedings  of thle  Business 
anzd  Economic  Statistics Section (1962), pp. 98-104, reprinted  in Okun, The Political 
Economy  of Prosperity  (Brookings  Institution,  1970), Appendix.  More recent estimates 
and evaluations  are  provided  in George  L. Perry,  "Labor  Force  Structure,  Potential  Out- 
put, and Productivity,"  Brookings  Papers  on  Economic  Activity  (3:1971),  pp. 533-65, and 
Arthur  M. Okun's  paper  in this volume. Hereafter  this document  will be referred  to as 
BPEA, followed by the date. 
5. Robert  J. Gordon,  "Inflation  in Recession  and Recovery,"  BPEA  (1:1971), p. 142. 
Using the same method,  Theodore  Morgan  has estimated  the cost of the Great Depres- 
sion as $470 billion (at 1950 prices).  See his Income  and Employment  (2d ed., Prentice- 
Hall, 1952), p. 119. 
6. Milton Friedman,  An Economist's  Protest (Thomas  Horton, 1972), pp. 5-6. Rohert .J. Gordon  135 
and demand). The analysis distinguishes between (1) a temporary  recession 
initiated by policy makers to reduce the rate of inflation, such as that in 
1969-70, and (2) a permanent increase in the goal for the unemployment 
rate. In neither case will explicit account be taken of the benefits associated 
with the lower inflation rate made possible by higher unemployment; thus 
the unemployment rate that is optimal with respect to the direct costs and 
benefits of unemployment might nevertheless be too low once its indirect 
inflationary consequences are considered. 
No one denies that aggregate  policy can cause temporary changes in the 
unemployment rate, but many question whether it can affect the unemploy- 
ment rate permanently, causing it to  deviate from the so-called natural 
rate: "there is always a temporary trade-off between inflation and unem- 
ployment; there is no permanent trade-off."7  Nevertheless, the permanent 
case is interesting for several reasons. First, even if the natural-rate hy- 
pothesis is valid, the exact value of the natural rate will always be uncertain, 
and hence debates will always arise between those who place heavy weight 
on the risks of an accelerating  inflation at a low unemployment target and 
less weight on the social costs of a relatively  high unemployment  target, and 
those who hold the opposite view. Second, the empirical evidence support- 
ing the natural-rate  hypothesis for the United States is still sufficiently  in- 
conclusive that many economists maintain their interest in the long-run 
tradeoff. Third, a plausible argument can be made for a long-run tradeoff 
curve that has a vertical segment above a threshold inflation rate but is 
negatively sloped below that rate, thus allowing analysis of the optimum 
location on the negatively sloped segment.8 
The point of departure  for this analysis is Okun's law, which states that a 
change of 1 percentage point in the aggregate unemployment rate is asso- 
ciated in the short run with a change of roughly 3 percent in the ratio of 
7. Milton Friedman,  "The Role of Monetary  Policy," in The Optimum  Quantity  of 
Money and Otlher  Essays (Aldine,  1969), p.  104. 
8. A theoretical  argument  for this asymmetry  is contained  in James  Tobin, "Inflation 
and Unemployment,"  American  Economic  Review,  Vol. 62 (March 1972),  p. 11. A long- 
run tradeoff  curve of this type is implied by the variable  coefficient  model estimated  in 
my "Wage-Price  Controls  and the Shifting  Phillips  Curve,"  BPEA  (2:1972), pp. 404-06. 
See also Otto Eckstein and Roger  Brinner, The Inflation Process  in the United States,  A 
Study Prepared  for the Use of the Joint Economic  Committee,  92 Cong. 2 sess. (1972). 
The absence  of any tendency  to an accelerating  deflation  in 1938-39, despite  eight years 
of unemployment  at a rate of 14 percent  or above, also suggests  that at high unemploy- 
ment rates the long-run tradeoff  curve may be negatively  sloped or horizontal  rather 
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actual  to potential  output,  and which  thereby  suggests  that productivity, 
hours,  and  labor  force  participation  are also altered  by a change  in aggre- 
gate  demand.  But  Okun's  law  is defective  as a means  of measuring  welfare, 
because  it considers  only  changes  in the value  of output  sold on the market 
and  ignores  those  in the value  of nonmarket  activity.  Calculations  like my 
crude  $100  billion  estimate  cited  above  make  the extreme  assumption  that  a 
zero "price  of time"  should  be imputed  to the increase  in nonmarket  ac- 
tivity  by the unemployed,  and  by those  who work  fewer  hours  or leave  the 
labor  force.  A second  major  criticism  of this approach  that is relevant  to 
the case of a permanent  increase  in the unemployment  rate  is that  the very 
large  elasticity  of output  with  respect  to changes  in the unemployment  rate 
observed  in U.S. postwar  recessions  is due to short-run  disequilibrium 
phenomena  that will  tend  eventually  to disappear. 
The  paper  is divided  into  three  major  parts:  (1) conceptual  analysis  of the 
temporary  case,  (2) empirical  estimates  based  on previous  studies  of labor 
supply  behavior  and the activities  of the unemployed,  and (3) conceptual 
analysis  of the permanent  case in the context  of the neoclassical  theory  of 
the  demand  for  and  the  supply  of labor.  The  empirical  estimates  are  gathered 
together  and summarized  in Table 3 below for the temporary  case and 
Table  4 for the permanent  case. 
Conceptual  Framework:  The  Temporary  Case 
THE NARROW  OKUN  S LAW  VIEW 
A crude  statement  of Okun's  law can be obtained  by manipulation  of a 
few simple  identities.  Actual  real output  (Q) is identically  equal  to output 
per  manhour  (q)  times  manhour  input  (M). Manhour  input  (M) can be re- 
written  as the employment  rate  (e) times  the labor  force  participation  rate 
(f)  times the number  of hours per man per time period (H) times the 
working-age  population  (P):9 
(1)  Q-qM-qefHP. 
Output  and  the first  four magnitudes  on the right-hand  side of (1) can be 
defined  at their "potential"  values  reached  at some arbitrary  unemploy- 
9. With  absolute  employment  denoted  by E, and the labor force by F, the right-hand 
side of (1) can be written  out in full: (Q/EH)(E/F)(F/P)(H)(P). Robert J. Gordon  137 
ment rate, say,  4 percent. The ratio of  actual to  potential real output 
(Q/Q*) can be written: 
(2)  Q  Q  qM  qefH 
(2)  Q*  g*M*-q*e*f*H*' 
where potential values are denoted by an asterisk.  The percentage  change of 
the ratio of actual to potential output (gQ/Q*)  can be decomposed into its 
four components: the changes in productivity, in the employment rate, in 
the labor force participation rate, and in hours per employee: 
(3)  g(Q/Q*)  g(q,q)  +  g(e/e*)  +  g(f/f*)  +  g(H/H*); 
here gx denotes the percentage change in x. Okun's law states that the elas- 
ticity of the ratio of actual to potential real output with respect to a change 
in the employment rate is a constant (k), roughly equal to 3.0. 
(4) 
g(Q/Q*)  =  k  -  3.0. 
9(e/e*) 
Based on this approach, a crude initial estimate of the welfare cost asso- 
ciated with a temporary increase of  1 percentage point in the unemploy- 
ment rate (1  -  e)-from,  say, 4 to 5 percent-would  be 3 percent of real 
output, about $38 billion per year at 1973 price and output levels. If pro- 
ductivity, labor force participation, or hours did not respond in a recession, 
the elasticity of the ratio of actual to potential real output with respect to a 
change in the employment rate would be 1.0 by definition and the welfare 
cost, by this approach, would be only $12.7 billion instead of $38 billion. 
Of the remaining 2 percentage points of output response, about 1 point is 
due to the procyclical response of hours and participation  rates as overtime 
is reduced  in a recession and the proportion of workers on involuntary  part- 
time rises, and as secondary workers leave the labor force or delay their 
entry or reentry  when they find  jobs scarce. The final percentage  point is due 
to the procyclical response of productivity. While firms can quickly reduce 
the utilization of capital equipment, they may curtail employment only very 
little relative to output during a short recession in order to avoid the costs 
of  hiring and firing-recruiting  costs,  employer-financed investments in 
training, and severance pay.10  Another cause of procyclical fluctuations in 
10. See, for instance,  Walter  Y. Oi, "Labor  as a Quasi-Fixed  Factor,"  Journal  of Po- 
litical  Economy,  Vol. 70 (December  1962),  pp. 538-55, and Donald 0. Parsons,  "Specific 
Human Capital:  An Application  to Quit Rates and Layoff Rates,"  Journal  of Political 
Economy,  Vol. 80 (November/December  1972), pp. 1120-43. 138  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1973 
productivity is that during recessions, the composition  of  output shifts 
away from durable manufacturing  with its high productivity levels. 
A BROADER  VIEW 
The basic weakness of the Okun's law approach is its failure to impute a 
positive value to nonmarket activity. A  decline in the number of hours 
worked in a cyclical recession increases by an equal number the hours de- 
voted to nonmarket activity, which partially offsets the loss in market out- 
put. An  extreme view might claim that the reduction of market output 
could be completely offset if the recession is assumed to  begin from an 
initial situation of labor market equilibrium at an unemployment rate of, 
say, 4 percent.11  To simplify the discussion I assume throughout that the 
real wage remains fixed in the recession.12  In the initial equilibrium  workers 
offer their services up to the point at which the real wage rate is equal to the 
marginal product of an hour of nonmarket activity. If a cyclical recession 
were to take the form of a one-hour reduction in the workweek for all em- 
ployees, the recession would cost society virtually nothing, according to 
this extreme view, since the lost  wage would be  offset by the marginal 
product of the hour spent in nonmarket activity. 
A formal statement of the role of nonmarket activity helps to clarify the 
conditions under which this "extreme view" is correct. To simplify the dis- 
cussion, both the adult population (P) and potential output (Q*) are held 
fixed. The total number of manhours available to each individual is 168 per 
week and is divided between manhours spent on current  jobs (M) produc- 
ing market goods (Q), hours spent by unemployed individuals searching or 
11. Positive unemployment  occurs in this initial situation despite balance between 
aggregate  labor supply and demand because of search  activity by new entrants  to the 
labor force and by employed workers attempting  to find more satisfactory  jobs, and 
because of a geographic,  demographic,  or occupational imbalance  between  jobs and 
job seekers. 
12. The assumption  of a fixed real wage is made to simplify  the subsequent  analysis 
and eliminate  distributional  complications;  the aim is to examine  the consequences  of 
unemployment  associated  with a fixed real wage and not to explain  the tendency  of the 
real wage to be inflexible  in the short run. The rate of inflation  of prices and nominal 
wages is also assumed  to be unaffected  by the temporary  decline in demand, so as to 
permit  concentration  on the welfare  costs of unemployment  and neglect of the distribu- 
tional effects of unanticipated  changes in the rate of inflation. For evidence that the 
tradeoff  curve in the United States is virtually  horizontal  over a period of one to two 
years, see the illustration  in my "Inflation  in Recession and Recovery,"  p. 138. Robert J. Gordon  139 
waiting for new jobs (U), and hours spent on "home activity" (N), which 
includes time devoted to  consumption, household production (including 
child care), and sleep. The welfare of households depends on their total 
output of "final  commodities" (Z), which they produce by combining goods 
purchased on the market (Q) and their own nonmarket time: 
(5)  Z = f(Q,L,N). 
The production of a meal, for example, requires  purchased groceries (part 
of  Q) and hours spent in shopping and cooking (part of N). The time of 
unemployed individuals (U)  is also productive in raising future income, 
monetary or psychic, as is explained in more detail below.13 
The aim here is to measure the effect of a change in the employment rate 
(e) on the output of final commodities: 
dZ=  dQ  fdU  fd  (6)  de 
Q 
de 
u  de+  N  de 
where fQ, fu,  and fN  are the marginal products of,  respectively, market 
goods, unemployed time, and home time in producing final commodities. 
In equilibrium  these marginal products are equal to, respectively,  the price 
of market goods (pQ),  the price per unit of unemployed time (wu), and the 
price per unit of home time (WN),  each deflated by the price of the  final 
commodity (pz): 
(7)  fQ =  PQ;  fu  = 
W;  fN  =  WN 
Pz,  Pz,  Pz' 
The term WN has also been called, alternatively, "the shadow wage" and 
"the price of time." 
Because the three uses of time exhaust the fixed length of the week, any 
change in market manhours per week (dM) must be offset exactly by  a 
change in unemployed manhours and home time: 
dM  dU  dN 
(8)  ~+-+  = 0.  (8)  -  de  +  de  de 
The substitution of (7) and (8) into (6), and the decomposition of the change 
in  output  (dQ/de)  into  separate manhour  (qdM/de)  and productivity 
13. This approach  to the analysis  of household  production  is an extension  of Gary  S. 
Becker, "A Theory of the Allocation of Time," Economic  Journal,  Vol. 75 (September 
1965), pp. 493-517. Equation (5) differs from Becker's formulation  in giving explicit 
attention  to the search  and waiting  time of the unemployed. 140  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1973 
(Mdq/de) effects, yields the following expression for the response of the 
output of final commodities: 
(9)  deP  p_de  P[b  de  -q-P)  de' 
[a]  [b]  [c] 
where the letters in brackets identify the separate terms in (9) to  facilitate 
the subsequent discussion. 
The total effect of unemployment in (9) is divided into three parts. The 
first, [a], is the productivity part of the basic Okun's law  response and 
represents  the loss in output caused by the decline in productivity per mar- 
ket manhour due to labor hoarding, the drop in capital utilization, and the 
shifting industry mix of output. If the real wage does not change, the entire 
loss from lower productivity takes the form of lower net income to capital 
and lower tax revenues. 
The final two terms, [b] and [c], measure the net loss at fixed relative 
prices of the shift of a unit of time from work to, respectively, unemployed 
and home time. If Wu/PQ and WN/pQ (the real prices of  unemployed and 
home time) were zero-the  simple Okun's law case-each  manhour shifted 
from work would cause the loss of the average  product of that manhour (q). 
But, since these two terms are positive, the value of the loss is less than out- 
put per manhour, and would be zero in the extreme case of equality among 
the three terms.14  The bulk of this paper consists of a detailed assessment of 
these two terms, [b] and [c], for the case of a temporary change in the em- 
ployment rate. The contribution of [a], representing  the productivity loss, 
has been estimated previously and requires  no special attention in the tem- 
porary case (although it is the main topic in the final section below on the 
permanent case). 
FURTHER  CONSIDERATIONS  ON  THE GENERAL APPROACH 
Equation (9) may appear to be incomplete, because it excludes the effect 
of a changing employment rate on the price of unemployed time and home 
time. When market output declines and fewer purchased goods are avail- 
able to be combined with an increased amount of home time, the value of 
that home time must decline. Similarly, the value of unemployed time is 
14. The term outside  the brackets,  PQ/PZ, will simply  be 1.0 if both price indexes are 
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lower when fewer  jobs are available. While these effects do occur, they are 
completely offset by the increase in the value of  the remaining market 
goods, since relatively  more time is available to combine with them (for ex- 
ample, a television set is more valuable when more hours are available for 
viewing it).15 
Equation (9) indicates the rather stringent conditions necessary to vali- 
date the extreme view that a change in the employment rate would have no 
effect on welfare. One possibility is that the change in productivity (dq/de) 
and the terms [q  -  (Wu/PQ)] and [q  -  (WN/pQ)] are all zero. Empirical 
studies of Okun's law indicate that in temporary recessions dq/de is posi- 
tive. As for the other two terms, real output can be divided between the 
after-tax real income  of  labor  [(w/pQ)M], the  after-tax real  income  to 
capital (K), and the real tax revenue of the government (I): 
(10)  Q_M=KM?K+T. 
PQ 
When (10) is divided by total market manhours (M) and when the real price 
of home time is subtracted from both sides of the equation, the difference 
between average productivity (q =  Q/M)  and the real price of home time 
can be written as 
(11)  q-PQ  =  (wPAS  )  +  ?+  T 
A similar expression can be written for unemployed time. 
Thus the difference between average productivity and the real price of 
home time can be zero only if the price of home time is equal to the market 
wage, capital yields no income, and there are no taxes. In the context of the 
U.S. economy, average productivity  must be at least double the real price of 
15. The nominal  value of final  commodity  output is identical  to the sum of the "pay- 
ments"  to the factors  that produce  final output: 
(a)  PZZ  =  PQQ  +  WUU  +  VNN. 
After both sides of (a) are divided through  by pz, the total response  of real final com- 
modity output to a change in the employment  rate is 
b)  dZ  PQ dQ  wu dU  +WN  dN  +  Qd(pQ/pz) +  d(wu/pz)  +  Nd(wN/Pz) 
de  p z d-e  pz _de  pz de  de  de  de 
But when equation (7) is substituted  into (6), dZ/de is equal to the first three terms of 
equation (b). Therefore  the final three terms,  representing  the effect of a changing  em- 
ployment rate on the relative prices of market commodities, unemployed  time, and 
home time, must sum to zero. 142  Brookings Papers on Economic Activitv. 1:1973 
home time, since the income of capital and tax revenues make up almost 
exactly half of gross national product (GNP).16 Thus in the temporary case 
the shift of a manhour away from market activity causes the loss not only 
of the after-tax  wage per hour,  but also of the income earned on that hour by 
the (fixed) capital stock and all the sales, corporate, and personal taxes 
earned by government.17  Therefore, from the outset the extreme view is 
plainly incorrect in the case of a temporary recession, since all three terms 
in (9) are positive. For the extreme view to be correct in the permanent 
case, a reduction in the unemployment rate must cause a sufficient decline 
in productivity (that is, dq/de must be sufficiently negative) to  offset the 
positive contributions of the last two terms in equation (9), which represent 
the higher value of working rather than not working for those who would 
like to be employed. 
Some commentators have claimed that (11) is irrelevant in a world with 
W = Wu  =  WN and  no taxes  on the grounds  that  a reduction  in the employ- 
ment rate can cause no change in final commodities (dZ/de  =  0) even if the 
income of capital is positive. But this is incorrect in the temporary case be- 
cause, as long as the income of capital is positive, [q -  (W/PQ)] is positive; 
and thus the net effect in (9) can be zero only if dq/de is sufficiently  negative 
that is, if productivity increases when the employment rate declines in a 
recession. However negative the value of dq/de may be in the permanent 
case (discussed below), the empirical fact is that it is positive in the tempo- 
rary case and therefore dZ/de is positive even in the absence of taxes. 
The general expression (9) may also appear to be incomplete in its failure 
to include unemployment compensation explicitly. Surely, some may re- 
mark, the welfare cost of higher unemployment must depend inversely on 
the size of unemployment benefits; unemployed individuals must be better 
off now than was a person unemployed for the same duration in the 1930s. 
This view is true for the individual. But it ignores the distinction between 
the private cost  of unemployment, which is reduced by unemployment 
compensation, and the social cost, which may be increased as the compen- 
sation induces individuals to remain unemployed longer. In this sense un- 
employment compensation is not irrelevant  to calculations of welfare cost, 
as one might be tempted to argue on the grounds that it is simply a transfer 
16. In 1971 compensation  of employees minus personal tax and nontax payments 
was $527.1 billion, or 50.2 percent  of GNP. 
17. Depreciation  is assumed  to be a function  of time  rather  than of capital  utilization. 
Therefore,  a reduction in labor input causes a reduction in gross  income to capital 
without any offsetting  saving in the form of reduced  depreciation. Robert J. Gordon  143 
from one set of individuals to another that does not affect the total real in- 
come available to society. Like most taxes and subsidies, unemployment 
compensation produces a substitution effect, which reduces the price of un- 
employed time relative to work and with it the total amount of final com- 
modities (Z) available to society. 
Also missing from (9) are explicit terms for changes in formal education 
and on-the-job training. Time spent in formal education is classified with 
home time (N), and the return  per hour of education is considered a part of 
the shadow price of home time (wN).  Formal education therefore causes no 
problem other than those of any other use of home time if the shift of an 
hour from work to that activity is evaluated at the appropriate shadow 
price. Both employee- and employer-financed  on-the-job training have two 
effects  that in principle  should be taken into account. First, they raise the re- 
turn per hour of "work" above market output per manhour (q) and cause 
the two final terms of (9) to underestimate  the social cost of the shift of an 
hour from work to unemployed or home time. Second, on-the-job training 
may depreciate during unemployment or a spell out of the labor force, im- 
posing a social cost-"unlearning-by-not-doing"-beyond  that written ex- 
plicitly in (9). While these effects are not included in (9) to keep that expres- 
sion relatively simple, a crude estimate of their relative importance will be 
made below.18 
The Economics  of Searching  and  Waiting 
How does higher cyclical unemployment affect the price of unemployed 
time? Can a conclusion be reached on the approximate  empirical  magnitude 
of the net sacrifice  in income when hours shift from work to search: 
(q  _w)  dU? 
PQ 
18. A minor  problem  is raised  by the use of derivatives  in (9) to measure  changes  that 
may be relatively  large. Consumer  surplus  can be measured  accurately  if the price  terms 
in (9) are evaluated  midway between  their initial and final values, as in the discussion 
of  the  price of  home  time  below.  If for example  WU2  =  wul +  Awu, and  the estimate 
Wu  = 0.5(wu1 +  WU2)  is used, the term wuAM becomes wu1AM +  0.5AwuAM  and is 
identical  to expression  (5') in Arnold C. Harberger,  "Three  Basic  Postulates  for Applied 
Welfare Economics: An Interpretive  Essay," Journal  of Economic  Literature,  Vol. 9 
(September  1971),  p. 788. The present  paper  values  the shift of an hour away  from work 
activity  at the excess of its marginal  social benefit  over its marginal  social cost and thus 
is consistent with the postulates in Harberger's  essay, in which a number of possible 
objections  to the approach  are considered  and rejected. 144  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1973 
The idea that extra search time has a value that is deducted from the net 
sacrifice of higher unemployment may appear to pose  a paradox. Some 
may argue that it is higher unemployment itself that imposes the burden of 
extra search, and dispute a conceptual framework that appears to treat the 
value of unemployed time as a positive quantity rather  than as a deadweight 
loss. 
The view that extra unemployed time caused by a recession is a dead- 
weight loss rests, however, on an arbitrary  application of the distinction be- 
tween voluntary and involuntary unemployment. The proponents of this 
view may agree that (except for structural unemployment) the unemploy- 
ment in initial equilibrium serves the social purpose of sorting workers into 
the most appropriate  jobs.19 But, they would claim, an upward departure 
from this equilibrium unemployment rate serves no  such purpose, since 
employees who in equilibrium  were content with their  jobs are now search- 
ing against their will. However, the price of unemployed time (wu) must be 
positive if it has a positive opportunity cost, and the victims of cyclical un- 
employment have at least two alternatives:  They may either consume home 
time having a price WN or engage in market work activity that is instantane- 
ously available  without search,  for example, selling apples at an hourly wage 
of wa, These alternatives set a minimum value for the price of search time. 
In this sense unemployment that appears to be involuntary is actually vol- 
untary, since the unemployed can choose not to look for a job if the hourly 
return to  unemployment falls below  these minimum levels.  A  married 
woman may have a high value of WN relative to wu when her children are 
smali, but she may enter the labor force as her children reach the age at 
which her WN falls below her wu. 
The mere fact that the price of search time is positive does not necessarily 
mean that it is high relative to the previous market wage. The prices of 
search time and of home time, and the hourly return from selling apples, 
may all be sufficiently  low (or even negative for some adult males) to reduce 
substantially the income of an individual who loses his job in a recession. 
While some would underestimate  the price of search time by assuming it to 
be zero, others may overestimate it by setting it equal to the reservation 
price or acceptance wage of the unemployed (that is, the minimum wage at 
19. A large  percentage  of both quits  and layoffs  affects  employees  with very short  job 
tenure, presumably  reflecting,  in the case of quits, dissatisfaction  with jobs by the em- 
ployees  and, in the case of layoffs,  dissatisfaction  with employees  by firms.  See Robert  E. 
Hall, "Turnover  in the Labor Force," BPEA (3:1972), p. 723. Robert J.IGordon  145 
which an unemployed individual will accept a job). The social opportunity 
cost is lower than the after-tax acceptance wage by the amount of any un- 
employment compensation or welfare payments that society gives to the 
unemployed individual. 
THE PRICE  OF TIME DURING  UNEMPLOYMENT 
The price of unemployed time can be defined more precisely  by consider- 
ing in some detail the decision to accept or refuse a job offer. The marginal 
cost of refusing a job offer at the acceptance wage (y) is the forgone income 
at that wage rate, net of taxes and earning costs (commuting, uniforms, for 
example) amounting to a fraction (h) of the forgone income:20 
(12)  MC  =  (1 -  h)y. 
The time period over which (12) applies is the expected interval between 
job offers, which might be one day or six months. 
In considering a job offer, the unemployed individual balances the cost of 
refusal, given by (12), against the marginal return from refusal, which has 
several elements: (1) for a worker who has been laid off, the prospective 
value of recall to his old job at his old wage (wo),  where wo  is greater  than y; 
(2) to a worker who continues searching, the prospective value of an offer 
at the mean value of acceptable offers (x), where x is greater  than y; (3) to a 
worker who continues some minimum amount of search activity, the value 
of unemployment compensation benefits (b) and the cost of expenditures 
for search, such as bus fares, shoe leather, and the like, c(s), which depend 
on the fraction of time devoted to search, s; (4) to a worker who spends 
only a fraction (s) of his time searching, the value of home time consumed, 
(1 
-  S)WN. 
In Appendix A, these elements of the marginal return  to refusing an offer 
at the acceptance wage are developed in a formal model. Together with 
equation (12), expressing  the marginal cost of refusing  an offer, the model is 
used to  derive several results that characterize the  search process. The 
model is also used to check some of the empirical results presented below 
that are based on equation (12). 
20. My treatment  of commuting costs as equivalent  to a proportional  income tax 
assumes  that the value of time spent in commuting  is proportional  to the wage rate and 
that there are no nonproportional  elements  of transport  cost. 146  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1973 
The price of unemployed time (wu) required  for the purpose of this paper 
is the return to society of job refusal, consisting of the return to the unem- 
ployed individual minus the unemployment benefits paid by the rest of 
society to the unemployed. This price (wu) can thus be expressed as either 
marginal cost in (12) or marginal revenue as developed in Appendix A, in 
both cases reduced by the amount of unemployment benefits. Using the 
expression for marginal cost, the result is 
(13)  wu =  (1-h)y-b. 
The minimum acceptable wage set by an unemployed individual defines his 
private opportunity cost in activities other than work, but his social oppor- 
tunity cost is reduced by the amount of unemployment  compensation, since 
his acceptance of a job confers on society an external benefit in the form of 
lower taxes to finance unemployment compensation. A possible "conges- 
tion" effect, which further reduces the social relative to the private oppor- 
tunity cost, would be imposed if the decision to refuse a job lowered the 
probability of finding a job for others, but this refinement  is not made here. 
Figure 1 decomposes the social cost of time spent in unemployment. In 
the initial situation unemployment has an average duration t1 -  to, with a 
shadow price of  unemployed time of  wu0. The welfare cost  consists  of 
capital income  and taxes (areas A +  B);  unemployment compensation 
(area C); and the cost of search activity (area D), which depends on the 
acceptance wage (yo) and which reduces the minimum acceptable wage be- 
low the expected wage offer.21  Together, these four areas measure  the social 
cost per person unemployed. In a recession the reduction in the acceptance 
wage from yo to Yi for any given duration of unemployment imposes an 
extra cost (area E) on each original hour of unemployment. In addition 
extra hours of unemployment are experienced  as both the number of unem- 
ployment spells and their average duration rise. In the new situation, each 
spell has an extra social cost measured  by extending  the average duration of 
unemployment (area F). At recession values of the price of unemployment 
(wul)  and of duration (t2 -to),  the social welfare cost for each of the larger 
number of spells is now equal to the total value of areas A through F. 
21. The diagram  assumes  that the mean expected  wage (x) is equal to the previous 
wage  (wo).  If search  were  costless,  the minimum  acceptance  wage  would be set equal  to x, 
since marginal revenue is zero in appendix equation (A-2) when y  =  x  and when 
,  =  b =  c  =  0 and s  =  1. ..  1.~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~. 
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Empirical  Evidence on the Social Cost of Unemployment 
The task of this section is to measure the effect of higher cyclical unem- 
ployment on the social cost of unemployed time, as represented in (9) by 
the term 
(q- _u)  dU, 
and this requires data on two magnitudes that are not reported in the ag- 
gregate labor force statistics: the price of unemployed time (wu) and the 
number of  hours shifted into  unemployment (dU).22 Two  methods are 
available for estimating the price of unemployed time (wu), based either on 
(13), which states that wU  equals the after-tax acceptance wage minus the 
rate  of  unemployment compensation,  or  on  appendix equation  (A-2), 
which requires much more information on the components of marginal 
revenue from refusing an offer. Here the first route will be used to estimate 
the level of wu; Appendix A uses plausible values of the elements of mar- 
ginal revenue to provide a cross-check on these results. The following sec- 
tions of the text turn to the estimation of hours spent in unemployment (U) 
and their response to higher unemployment (dU/de). 
THE PRICE  OF UNEMPLOYED  TIME 
Relevant evidence on the price of unemployed time is collected in Table 1 
from several studies of unemployed individuals. Lines 1, 2, and 7 are studies 
of workers  displaced by plant shutdowns; lines 4 and 6 refer  to unemployed 
teenagers; and lines 3 and 5 concern search activity of all demographic 
groups without restriction on the source of unemployment. The table sum- 
marizes information available on the relation between the wage rate on 
previous  jobs (wo) and both the acceptance wage (y) and the wage rate on 
accepted  jobs (wl). Also listed are the monthly rates of decay of the accep- 
tance or offer wage rate and the ratio of unemployment benefits to the wage 
rate on the previous job.  Numerous cells are empty because the studies 
asked widely different questions. 
22. The price  of market  output (PQ)  is an index number  and can be arbitrarily  set at 
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The range for relative acceptance wages (y/wo)  is  quite wide at first 
glance-from  71.8 to 97.9 percent of the previous wage rate-but  closer in- 
spection narrows it. Kasper's high figure should be excluded since it re- 
sulted from the question "What wage.  . . are you (currently)  seeking?" and 
thus differs from the desired concept of a minimum  wage below which an 
offer will be refused.23  The other studies asked specifically about minimum 
acceptable wages;  for  example,  Sheppard and  Belitsky asked:  "When 
you've been looking for a new job, do you have some hourly wage or weekly 
salary that you won't go below-that  is, do you have in mind some mini- 
mum wage or salary? [If so,] what is the hourly rate, or weekly salary?"24 
Another possible ground for excluding certain responses is a previous 
wage that was relatively high or low. In the large sample of displaced de- 
fense workers surveyed by Folk and Hartman, the ratio y/wo has a strong 
negative relation with the level of wO.25  This result might be explained by a 
variant of the permanent income hypothesis: Workers at either extreme 
might consider their previous wage unusual and expect the wage on their 
next jobs to be closer to the average in the community. High-wage defense 
workers may have been working with relatively large amounts of firm- 
specific human capital which the plant shutdowns made obsolete, while the 
low-wage workers may have been relatively unskilled and may have ex- 
pected to remain so on their next job.  In the case of Dorsey's study, the 
23. Hirschel Kasper, "The Asking Price of Labor and the Duration of Unemploy- 
ment,"Review  ofEconomics  andStatistics,  Vol.49 (May 1967),  p. 168.  Stanley  Stephenson 
included  both types of questions  in his study: 
(a) "What  hourly  wage rate or weekly  take home pay would you like to earn on this 
job you are looking for?" 
(b) "What  is the minimum  hourly  wage rate or minimum  weekly  take home pay you 
would accept at present?" 
Stephenson  has informed  me that the mean response  to (a) was $2.78 for whites and 
$2.74 for blacks, but that to (b) was only $2.00 for whites and $1.93 for blacks. See 
Stanley P. Stephenson,  Jr., "The Economics of Job Search: A Biracial Analysis of 
Youth Job Search  Behavior"  (paper  presented  at the 1972  annual  meeting  of the Econ- 
ometric  Society; processed). 
24. Harold  L. Sheppard  and A. Harvey  Belitsky,  The  Job Hunt:  Job-Seeking  Behavior 
of Unemployed  Workers  in a Local Economy  (Johns Hopkins Press, 1966), p. 39. The 
figures  in column  (8) of Table 1  include  only those individuals  who answered  "yes"  to the 
first  question  (69 percent)  and are subject  to an unknown  bias from the omission of the 
remainder. 
25. Computed  from frequency  distribution  in Hugh Folk and Paul Hartman,  Pen- 
sions and Severance  Pay for Displaced  Defense Workers  (U.S. Arms Control and Dis- 
armament  Agency, 1969),  Table IV-9, p. 114. Robert J. Gordon  151 
low ratio of y/wo  can be explained similarly by the high previous wage 
level, which workers knew was due to an aggressive union and would not 
be attainable once the Mack plant had closed.26  At the other extreme, the 
minimum acceptance wage of teenagers in the Perrella study responds less 
with age than the actual wage, so y/wo  declines from 96 percent in the 
youngest group (16-17 years) to  82 percent in the oldest (20-21) years.27 
The discrepancy  between the Perrella and Stephenson results for teenagers 
is explained almost entirely by the older average age of Stephenson's sam- 
ple and its limitation to males. 
Because the Sheppard and Belitsky study includes a random sample of 
unemployed workers rather than just that subset caused by a plant shut- 
down, and their group would not appear to have had atypical previous 
wage rates, their values of y/wo  for adult men and adult women seem 
reasonable estimates for the United States as a whole. Perrella's  values will 
be used for teenagers, since they are consistent with Stephenson's but cover 
a larger and more representative  sample. Because evidence on the rate of 
decay of the acceptance wage as time passes is so scanty, I assume a con- 
stant y/wo ratio throughout unemployment. 
The next ingredient in the estimation of the price of search time is the 
rate of unemployment compensation relative to the previous wage rate. 
The ratios of about 36 percent reported in column (12) of Table 1 under- 
state the size of unemployment benefits for those covered by the unem- 
ployment insurance  program, both because programs have been liberalized 
since the early 1960s and because benefit rates must be compared with 
after-tax rather than before-tax wage rates. In  1971 the average weekly 
benefit paid under state unemployment insurance programs was $54.59.28 
Average gross weekly earnings in the private nonagricultural  economy, ad- 
justed for fringe benefits, were $142.55.29  Thus the benefit-earnings ratio 
appears to be 38.3 percent. 
26. "In a letter to the employees on October 10, 1958, the company indicated its 
dissatisfaction  with the incentive  wage situation,  which  at that time provided  an average 
incentive  rate for Mack workers  of over $3.50 an hour, as compared  with the average 
rate elsewhere  in the automotive-truck  manufacturing  industry  of $2.51 an hour."  John 
W. Dorsey, "The Mack Case: A Study in Unemployment,"  in Otto Eckstein (ed.), 
Studies  in the Economics  of Income  Maintenance  (Brookings  Institution,  1967),  p. 177. 
27. Vera C. Perrella,  "Young Workers  and their Earnings,"  Monthly  Labor  Review, 
Vol. 94 (July 1971),  Table 1, p. 4. Age-specific  results  arenot  presented  separately  by sex. 
28. Monthly  Labor Review,  various issues, statistical section, Table 10. 
29. Average weekly earnings  from Economic  Report of the President  Together  with 152  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1973 
But this estimate is faulty for at least two reasons: because only a fraction 
of the unemployed receive unemployment benefits, and because the average 
earnings of those who become unemployed are lower than the average for 
all employed individuals. In 1971 only 43.1 percent of the unemployed were 
covered under the state unemployment insurance program.30  Many of the 
remainder  were teenagers  living with their parents, or wives whose husbands 
remained employed; neither of these two groups would have been eligible 
for welfare or food stamps. Some of the uncovered unemployed-for  exam- 
ple, teenagers living alone, single adult women, and adult males in un- 
covered industries-may  have received welfare payments or food stamps, 
which are conceptually identical to unemployment benefits if they are con- 
tingent on remaining unemployed. In the absence of detailed information, 
20 percent of the uncovered unemployed will be assumed to have received 
other government compensation, raising "effective" coverage to 54.5 per- 
cent, which, when multiplied by the average covered benefit of  $54.59, 
yields an "effective" benefit of $29.75. 
As for the average previous wage (wo) of the unemployed, a study by the 
Bureau of Labor Statistics of those unemployed five weeks and more in 
1961 found that, on the average, they had earned about $70 per week on 
their last job, whereas average weekly earnings adjusted for fringe benefits 
in 1961 were $89.87.31  In 1971  the average  previous wage of the unemployed 
was presumably lower relative to average hourly earnings because during 
the previous decade the composition of the unemployed had shifted toward 
women and teenagers to a greater extent than the composition of the em- 
ployed. This demographic shift implies a 1971 average wage of the unem- 
ployed equal to 69 percent of the average hourly earnings of the employed, 
or $98.31.32 An adjustment for taxes and commuting expense brings the 
the Annual  Report  of the Council  of Economic  Advisers,  January  1973,  Table  C-31. Here- 
after this document  will be referred  to as Economic  Report,  followed by the year. The 
adjustment  for fringe  benefits  is calculated  as the ratio of compensation  of employees  to 
wages and salaries;  ibid.,  Table C-15. 
30. Manpower  Report of thle  President,  1972, Tables A-14 and D-5. Hereafter  this 
document  will be referred  to as Manpower  Report,  followed by the year. 
31. Earnings  on last job of the unemployed  is from Robert L. Stein, "Work  History, 
Attitudes,  and Income  of the Unemployed,"  Monthly  Labor  Review,  Vol. 86 (December 
1963), p. 1410. Average hourly earnings adjusted  for fringe benefits in 1961 is from 
Economic  Report,  1973, Table C-31. 
32. Using separate  weights  for eight  age-sex  groups,  the ratio (R) of the average  wage 
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relevant after-tax weekly earnings figure down to  $61.20, and thus the 
"effective"  unemployment benefit is 48.6 percent of the relevant after-tax 
wage rate.33 
These estimates can now be combined in an estimate of the price of 
search time if equation (13) is rewritten: 
(14)  Wu=  -w  (l-h)]  wo (1-h) 
The estimate of wu  is then only 34.2 percent of the previous after-tax  wage, 
or only $20.93 per week for 1971.34  It thus pays the average unemployed 
individual to remain unemployed if the expected present value of an extra 
week of search exceeds $20.93. This estimate, as small as it may seem, 
probably overstates the price of search time, since it ignores the congestion 
effect of job refusal in reducing the price of search time for others. 
0.881 in 1961 to 0.780 in 1971,  where 
R  =  IiiUi. 
Ii is average  weekly earnings  of group i relative  to males aged 35-44, from George L. 
Perry,  "Changing  Labor Markets  and Inflation,"  BPEA  (3:1970), p. 440, and Us  and E, 
are, respectively,  the shares of total unemployment  and employment  of group i, from 
Manpower  Report,  1972, Tables  A-10 and A-15. The 1961 survey  estimated  the average 
previous  wage of the unemployed  to be 77.9 percent  of average  hourly earnings;  this 
fraction multiplied  by R1971/R1961  corrects  for the demographic  shift between  the two 
years if the relative  wages within  each demographic  group remained  constant. 
33. Two months  of unemployment  would cause a loss of income of $852.02, which 
in 1971 would reduce personal  income tax liability by $152.00 on the assumption  of a 
joint return using standard  deductions filed by a married  couple with two children. 
Social security  contributions  would be reduced  by $44.31, and state income tax in, for 
example,  Illinois  would be reduced  by $21.30  (a rate of 2.5 percent  on income  above an 
exemption of $1,000 per person). This amounts to an effective marginal  rate of 25.5 
percent,  compared  with 26.8 percent  calculated  by Feldstein for a similar  situation in 
Massachusetts;  see "Lowering  the Permanent  Rate of Unemployment,"  Preliminary 
Report prepared  for the Joint Economic Committee  by Martin  S. Feldstein  and Asso- 
ciates (no date; processed),  p. 79. In addition, I make an adjustment  for commuting 
expense of $4.50 per week (five round trips without transfers  at current  fares on the 
Chicago  Transit  Authority),  plus $1.50 per hour for five hours per week for the loss of 
home time during  commuting. 
34. The first  term  in (14), y/wo, is a weighted  average  of the values  in Table 1, column 
(8), for the Sheppard-Belitsky  and Perrella  studies.  Weights  are  based  on the share  of the 
increase  in unemployment  between  1969 and 1971 of six demographic  groups,  men and 
women aged 16-19, 20-24, and 25 and over. The value of y/wo  for men and women 
20-24 is assumed  to be a simple average  of the values for the 16-19 and 25 and over 
groups.  The result  of this calculation  is a weighted  average  of 0.828, minus  the value of 
b/[wo(l -  h)] calculated above of 0.486, which equals 0.342 of the after-tax  wage of 
$61.20. 154  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1973 
HOURS  SPENT  IN  SEARCH 
No  evidence  on  the  intensity  of  search activity is  available for  an 
economy-wide sample.35  But the scattered evidence appears to imply many 
fewer than forty hours per week devoted to search, and suggests that un- 
employment increases  home time considerably more than search time, even 
for those who do not expect to be rehired. Since the estimates of hours 
spent in search do not play a crucial role in the final conclusions on the wel- 
fare cost of higher unemployment, the detailed discussion of the evidence is 
relegated to Appendix C. The outcome is an estimate that the average un- 
employed  individual spends only  about  8.4  hours  per week  in  search 
activity. 
The Price of Home Time 
The low apparent intensity of search activity derived from the scattered 
evidence in Appendix C suggests that recent economic theory may have put 
too much emphasis on the economics of search and too little on the "eco- 
nomics of waiting." Furthermore,  the distinction between conventional and 
disguised unemployment virtually disappears in light of this evidence that 
both groups are primarily occupied with home activity. Of those who are 
past the first month of relatively intensive search, the subset that claims to 
have searched  in the past four weeks and is thereby classified as unemployed 
may be distinguished from the subset classified as "not in labor force" 
more by its desire to retain unemployment benefits than by a significantly 
different pattern of daily activity. 
Previously suggested imputations for the price of nonmarket activity 
have ranged from the market wage rate in studies of passenger transport to 
Tobin's suggestion that the time spent by laid-off employees awaiting recall 
is a "deadweight loss," perhaps influenced by remarks in Bakke's depres- 
sion case studies-"My  time has no value," and "Of course if I figured in 
35. Aggregate  data are collected only on the number  of job-search  techniques  used, 
not on the frequency  of their use (for example,  the number  of visits to firms)  or on the 
number  of hours  devoted  to each  technique;  they are  reported  for 1970-71  in Thomas  F. 
Bradshaw,  "Jobseeking  Methods Used by Unemployed  Workers,"  Monthly  Labor  Re- 
view, Vol.  96 (February  1973), pp. 35-40. Robert J. Gordon  155 
my own time, that wood would cost me as much as if I bought it, but my 
time isn't worth anything when I don't have a job."36 
As long as work does not yield utility directly (beyond the money it pro- 
vides)-an  assumption to be questioned below-the  standard assumption 
is that, for participants in the labor force, "the value of their time equals 
their wage rate."37  Labor force participants  are assumed to vary their hours 
of work (H) to equate the market real wage rate to their real price of time 
(wN), which can be defined by 
(15)  WNi  =f(H(e),wj(e),A), 
where i refers to one family member, wj  is the real market wage of the other 
family member, and A is the nonwage income of the family.38  Both H and 
Wi  are written as functions of the aggregate employment rate to reflect the 
effect of a cyclical recession on hours and unemployment of other family 
members. The cyclical response of wNi  is then the total derivative of (15) 
with respect to the aggregate unemployment rate: 
(16)  dwNf _  Of d 
de  OH de  Ow3  de' 
Here, af/OH is the inverse of the uncompensated substitution effect of an 
increase in the market wage on work effort; when this term is positive, as it 
appears to be in most studies for married  women, a cyclical decline in hours 
causes a reduction in the price of  time.  Similarly, for married women, 
Of/Owj  is the effect of the husband's wage on the wife's price of time and is 
presumably positive. Both the husband's earnings and nonwage  income 
provide goods that raise the marginal product of home time, and thus a 
36. E. Wight Bakke, The Unemployed  Worker:  A Study of the Task of Making a 
Living  Without  a Job  (Yale University  Press  for the Institute  of Human  Relations, 1940), 
pp. 169, 200. For a brief survey of the literature  on passenger  transport  see Reuben 
Gronau, The Value  of Time in Passenger  Transportation:  Thle  Demand  for Air Travel 
(Columbia University Press for the National Bureau of Economic Research, 1970), 
pp. 57-58. 
37. Reuben Gronau,  "The Intrafamily  Allocation of Time: The Value of the House- 
wives' Time" (paper presented at Conference on Research in Income and Wealth, 
November  4-6, 1971; processed),  p. 6. 
38. A similar  equation  is formally  derived  in Appendix  I of James  Heckman,  "Shadow 
Prices, Market Wages,  and Labor Supply," working paper  (National Bureau of Eco- 
nomic Research,  October 1972; processed).  Heckman's  equation  (3) differs  only by in- 
cluding  extra  terms  for prices  of goods (assumed  constant  in this paper)  and for previous 
events exogenous  to the current  problem,  for example,  education  and children. 156  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1973 
cyclical decline in the husband's earnings through unemployment or short 
hours reduces the wife's price of time. 
Most  recent labor supply studies have emphasized estimation of  the 
labor supply response in (16) and have provided little information on the 
level of the price of time. Yet the crude assumption that the price of time 
equals the market wage is unsatisfactory for several reasons. 
First, personal direct taxes and commuting costs drive a wedge between 
the value of a worker's marginal product and his net earnings. Since his 
labor supply decisions presumably depend on the latter, the price of home 
time must lie below the level of average hourly (gross) earnings. 
Second, just as unemployment benefits reduce the price of search time 
relative to the acceptance wage, so the availability of welfare benefits re- 
duces the price of home time. Any government payment that is contingent 
on not working has the same effect as direct taxes on work income. 
Third, even without taxes the acceptance wage lies below the average 
market wage when search is costly and requires  the sacrifice of earnings to 
locate jobs paying a wage rate above the acceptance wage. 
Fourth, any negative or positive psychic income yielded by work must be 
added to the market wage before it is compared with the price of time. 
Finally, for nonparticipants  in the labor force no observation is available 
on the market wage. The price of time is presumably  higher for nonpartici- 
pants than for others with the same education and skills, but by an undeter- 
mined amount.39  Fortunately, this problem is not serious here, because the 
analysis requires an estimate of the price of time only for those who reduce 
their hours of work or lose their jobs.  If they were working prior to the 
recession their price of time could not have been higher than the relevant 
market wage rate after taxes. 
EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE  ON THE PRICE  OF HOME TIME 
The estimation of the price of home time for those who reduce their 
hours, become unemployed, or leave the labor force during a cyclical reces- 
sion requires  knowledge of the intercept and slope of the appropriate  after- 
tax labor supply curve, which can be read from right to left as a demand 
39. An analysis  of this problem  is contained  in Reuben  Gronau,  "The Wage  Rates of 
Women: A Selectivity  Bias," working  paper  (National Bureau  of Economic Research, 
September  1972; processed). Robert J. Gordon  157 
curve for home time, as depicted in Figure 2 by the schedule LL'. First, 
however, a troublesome difficulty  must be resolved. Imagine that the curve 
LL' has been estimated from a cross-section consisting of two observations, 
at A and B. There are two quite different interpretations of this aggregate 
schedule: 
(1) The individuals are identical and each has a supply curve LL'. Then 
the value of home time is LA  DO for the first and LBCO for the second. The 
average price of home time for an individual who leaves the labor force in a 
recession is thus halfway between his net wage (w1 or w2) and the intercept 
of the supply curve (OL). The triangles w1AL  and w2BL  are the lost rent on 
inframarginal  hours due to labor market departure. 
(2) The individuals are different, each having a horizontal supply curve 
w1A and  w2B respectively-which  intersects the  two  labor  demand 
schedules at A and B, respectively. In this case the average price of home 
time is the net wage (w1 or w2). 
Figure 2.  The Price of Home Time for the Unemployed  or Partially 
Employeda 
Real 
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Since, as far as I know, labor economists have provided no evidence on 
which of these interpretations is correct, I will assume that the truth lies 
halfway between the two.  Thus the average price of home time will be 
taken as the intercept of the supply curve plus 75 percent of the difference 
between the net wage and the intercept. The net wage is the estimated ac- 
ceptance wage adjusted for taxes and working costs. 
Since the labor supply behavior of adult men, adult women, and teen- 
agers  differs in  character, evidence  on  each  group  will  be  evaluated 
separately. 
Mar}  ied women. For married  women with no access to welfare  payments, 
the price of home time at the mar-gin,  after adjustment for search costs, 
taxes, and commuting expense, is estimated at approximately $1.85 per 
hour in  1971.40  Innumerable previous studies have estimated the labor 
supply curve, and a complete survey of them is beyond the scope of this 
paper. Some recent estimates are presented in the first section of Table 2. 
Despite other differences,  the elasticity of hours with respect to changes in 
the wage rate appears  to fali in a relatively narrow range, between 0.66 and 
0.95. The estimates of the intercept along the zero hours axis differs sub- 
stantiafty, ranging between -  $0.68 per hour and $0.79 per hour. This dis- 
persion should be expected, since the samples in these studies contain few 
observations near the axes, and there is no reason to expect a uniformly 
linear relationship.41  Because the final results are not sensitive to the choice 
of intercept, I chose the origin. By this compromise technique, then, the 
price of home time for women is 75 percent of $1.85, or $1.39. 
Adult men. The evidence in section 2 of Table 2 suggests that the labor 
40. The pretax hourly wage is taken as the 1960 "average potential wage" from 
Reuben Gronau, "The Effect of Children  on the Housewife's  Value of Time," Journal 
of Political  Economy,  Vol. 81 (March/April 1973,  Pt. 2), p. S199. Then this wage rate is 
assumed  to grow  during  1960-71 at the same rate as average  hourly  earnings  in the U.S. 
private  economy, from Economic  Report,  1973,  Table C-30. A fringe-benefit  adjustment 
is computed as the ratio of compensation of employees to wages and salaries, from 
Economic  Report,  Table C-15. This is converted  into an acceptance  wage by multiplying 
by 0.806, the Sheppard-Belitsky  ratio of the acceptance  wage to the previous  wage for 
adult women (from Table 1), and then adjusted  for a 37.7 percent deduction  (as above 
in the computation  of wu)  to reflect  working  costs and taxes. 
41. Hall presents  results for nonlinear  supply curves, but on his curves for married 
women with children  the closest points to the axes lie at about $1.00 per hour and 300 
hours  per year.  Robert E. Hall, "Wages,  Income  and Hours of Work in the U.S. Labor 
Force,"  in Glen G. Cain and Harold W. Watts  (eds.),  Labor  Supply  and  Income  Mainte- 
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Table 2.  Selected Evidence from Studies of Labor Supply Behaviora 
Units  of w =  $1,000;  units of H  =  hours per year 
Unconpenisated  response  of Hi 
Holirly 
wage  Elasticity  Slope 
Year anid  Group  intercept 
Study  data  source  covered  at  H  =  O  w'  Wj  dHi/dwvi  dHi/dwy 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 
1.  Adult  women 
a.  Ashenfelter-  1960 U.S.  All adult 
Heckmnan  (I)  Census  women  -0.68  0.874  -1.204  186  -148 
b. Heckman  1967 National  White wives, 
Longitudinal  30-44  0.79  0.66  n.a.  649  n.a. 
Survey 
c.  Leibowitz  1960 U.S.  Women over 
Census  14  -0.26  0.946  n.a.  202  n.a. 
2.  Adult  men 
a.  Ashenfelter-  1960 U.S. 
Heckman (I)  Census  Adult men  ...  0.003  0.030  18  lb 
b. Ashenfelter-  1967 Survey  Spouse present 
Heckman (II)  of Economic  but not 
Opportunity  working  ...  -0.15  n.a.  -38  n.a. 
c.  Hall  1967 Survey  White 
of Economic  husbands, 
Opportunity  20-59  ...  n.a.  n.a.  -78b  n.a. 
Sources: See Appendix B. 
a.  H  =  hours of work 
w  =  real  wage 
i =  one family member 
wj =  real market wage of other family member 
d  =  derivative. 
b.  Coefficient is statistically insignificant. 
n.a.  Not listed in source. 
supply curve for adult men is essentially vertical with a slight backward 
bend. Evidence based on the 1967 Survey of Economic Opportunity, with a 
sample skewed toward low-wage individuals, indicates that white men work 
approximately 2,000 hours per year even at an hourly wage rate of $1.00.42 
Thus the average value of leisure time during the working day for an unem- 
ployed adult male is probably less than $1.00 per hour. 
Despite the fact that unemployed men do not spend much time searching 
for work after their first month of unemployment, the analytical framework 
of the earlier unemployment model applies to  the portion  of unemploy- 
ment devoted to "waiting." The marginal cost per week of remaining  unem- 
ployed, as opposed to taking a job at the acceptance wage, is the after-tax 
acceptance wage minus unemployment benefits, and is equally applicable 
whether  the individual actualiy goes out to search or waits at home. Search- 
ing or waiting is rational whenever the expected returns from not taking a 
42. Hall, "Wages,  Income and Hours of Work."  Hall's wage rates are adjusted  for 
federal  income tax but neither  social security  nor state income taxes. 160  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity. 1:1973 
job at the acceptance wage outweigh the costs. The estimated price of un- 
employed time (wu) sets an upper limit on the value of home time during 
unemployment, since otherwise the returns from taking a job at the accep- 
tance wage, net of taxes and forgone unemployment benefits, would be 
smaller than the returns from staying at home. 
The earlier  estimate of the price of search time applied to all unemployed 
individuals. For ali employed males in 1971 average gross weekly compen- 
sation was $180.94.43 Converted to an after-tax acceptance wage for the 
unemployed, this is reduced to the much lower figure of $75.87 per week.44 
On the assumption that all adult males are eligible for unemployment com- 
pensation at the average 1971 rate of $54.59 per week, the marginal weekly 
cost of search time becomes $21.28, or about the same as the average for 
all individuals. Divided into a forty-hour week, this comes to an hourly 
cost of $0.53. This figure is applicable only to the period before unemploy- 
ment benefits are exhausted, but this qualification would cover most  of 
those who become unemployed in moderate recessions. 
The low imputed value of home time of the unemployed, at a rate of only 
$0.53 per hour, may prove surprising. But if reasonably correct, it implies 
that in this respect the situation of the adult unemployed male today is not 
very different  from that of the subjects of Bakke's depression case studies, 
who reported, "My time has no  value." The crucial difference between 
them is not in the effect of unemployment on the value of the husband's 
time during normal working hours, but in the effect of unemployment on 
the value of the wife's time  and on the husband's time during normal 
leisure hours. When the consumption of goods declines drastically, as in the 
depression, the marginal product of all home time declines. Mealtime is 
less pleasant when beans are on the plate instead of steak, and recreation 
time less enjoyable when it  must be  spent at home  rather than at the 
43. Annual earnings  of employed male civilians in 1970 from U.S. Bureau of the 
Census,  Statistical  Abstract  of the United  States, 1972 (1972), p. 328, are converted  to 
1971, using Economic  Report,  1973, Table C-30, and adjusting  for fringe benefits  from 
Table C-15. 
44. The earlier  calculation  cited a study that indicated  that the wage on the last job 
for unemployed  individuals  in 1961 was 77.8 percent  of the average  for all employed 
individuals.  Since roughly half of this difference  is due to the different  demographic 
composition of the employed  and unemployed,  I assume  that the appropriate  ratio for 
adult males is 0.90. The ratio of the acceptance  wage to previous  wage is taken from 
Table 1 above, for the Sheppard-Belitsky  adult male sample (0.749). The adjustment 
for taxes  assumes  the same  marginal  rate  and  commuting  cost as did the earlier  computa- 
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movies.45 In the postwar period, on the other hand, unemployment bene- 
fits, improved net asset positions, and (most important) a shorter duration 
of joblessness have cushioned the decline in the consumption of market 
goods during unemployment.46 Another important change has been the 
shift in consumption to durables, which remain in the household and help 
to maintain the productivity of time even when income drops substantially. 
Some may argue that $0.53 per hour is too high a value to impute to the 
home time of unemployed males, since nonpecuniary benefits flow from 
working in a society where work is the normal daytime activity of adult 
males.47 A  sample of  100 relatively low-paid  blue-collar workers in  a 
Cleveland electronics factory was asked whether they would require a gov- 
ernment payment higher or lower than their present wage to stay at home 
instead of working. Seventy-five percent of the males responded that they 
would require  a higher payment, 25 percent "the same," and nobody "less." 
For  women the respective percentages were 56.5,  39.2,  and 4.3.48 This 
evidence of the nonpecuniary costs of staying at home is also consistent 
with the psychological studies of family tension caused by husbands who 
stayed at home and interfered  with the family household routine during the 
Great Depression.49 I find this argument rather persuasive and for the 
present purpose am inclined to set the value of home time for adult males 
at zero rather than at $0.53 per hour. 
Teenagers. Since nationwide data on the acceptance wage of teenagers 
have been collected (see Table 1), I accept these estimates after correction 
for taxes, yielding a value of home time of $1.27 at the margin.50  To main- 
45. For detailed  evidence  on the shift of leisure  time activities  of the depression  un- 
employed, see George A.  Lundberg, Mirra Komarovsky, and Mary A.  Mclnerny, 
Leisure:  A Suburban  Study  (Columbia  University  Press, 1934),  and National Recreation 
Association,  "The  Leisure  Hours of 5,000 People: A Report of a Study  of Leisure  Time 
Activities  and Desires"  (New York: The Association, 1934; processed). 
46. For detailed evidence on the relevant income elasticities of consumption, see 
Michael Grossman, "Unemployment  and Consumption:  Note," American  Economic 
Review,  Vol. 63 (March 1973),  pp. 208-13. 
47. I am sure that, like me, other work-at-home  professors  have had to answer  in- 
quisitive neighborhood  children who ask, "Today's Wednesday-why aren't you at 
work, mister?" 
48. The unpublished  survey  was taken by my student,  T. George, at Cleveland  Elec- 
tronics, Inc., in February  1973. 
49. Mirra  Komarovsky,  The Unemployed  Man and  His Family:  The  Effect of Unem- 
ployment  Upon  the  Status  of the Man  in Fifty-nine  Families  (Dryden, 1940). 
50. The Perrella  study  reported  in Table 1 yields  an average  acceptance  wage of $1.68 
for men and $1.64  for women.  The average  of $1.66 is adjusted  for taxes on the assump- 162  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1973 
tain symmetry with the treatment of adult women a zero intercept of the 
labor supply curve is assumed for teenagers, and the average  value of home 
time is estimated at 75 percent of $1.27, or $0.95. 
All workers. When these estimates for men, women, and teenagers are 
weighted by the shares of each demographic group in 1971 unemployment, 
the implied average price of home time for all unemployed individuals is 
$0.70 per hour, or 42 percent of the previous wage ($61.20 per week). Mul- 
tiplied by an average of 80 percent of unemployed time devoted to home 
time rather  than search  (WN(l  -  s) in equation A-2), this makes the value of 
home time 33.8 percent of the previous wage. This is very near the estimate 
arrived at in the discussion of the table in Appendix A, in which the mar- 
ginal revenue of job refusal is analyzed. 
Summary  of Effects for the Temporary  Case 
The implications of the previous estimates are iliustrated in Table 3 for a 
reduction of 1 percentage point in the unemployment rate from the 5.9 per- 
cent average of  1971. The first three lines summarize the  "traditional" 
Okun's law approach, which separates the increase in  output into four 
parts. The first three parts are the increases in manhours due to lower un- 
employment, entry into the labor force, and higher hours per employee. 
The price at which higher manhours are evaluated differs for each source: 
Labor force entrants have the lowest productivity since they consist almost 
entirely of teenagers and adult women. Next is the unemployed group, con- 
taining a higher fraction of adult men than the labor force entrants. The 
highest price is imputed to the increase in hours. Here the price used in 
Table 3 (line ic) is private output per manhour, which probably understates 
the value of increased  hours because they tend to be concentrated  in durable 
manufacturing. 
Line 2 represents the increase in private productivity that characteris- 
tically occurs along  with the  reduction in  unemployment. The  specific 
quantitative effects in lines 1 and 2 are based on Perry's estimates51  -a  1 
tion that teenagers  pay social security  tax, half the personal  income tax rate paid by 
adults  in the previous  examples  (because  many  teenagers  earn so little over the year that 
their income tax is either entirely  exempt or taxed at a low average  rate), and no state 
income tax. Commuting  expense of $0.15 an hour is assumed. 
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Table 3.  Welfare Effect of a Temporary  Decline of 1 Percentage Point in 
the Unemployment  Rate, 1971 Population and Productivity  Levels 
Price  per  Total value 
Manihours  manhour  (billions 
(billions)  (dollars)  of dollars)- 
Item in calculation  (1)  (2)  (3) 
1. Increase  in manhours,  qdM 
a. Lower unemployment  1.618  5.40  8.74 
b. Entrance  to labor force  1.058  4.58  4.85 
c.  Higher hours  0.623  7.82  4.87 
2. Increase  in productivity,  Mdq  117.700  0.08  9.90 
3.  Total  gain in market GNP  ...  ...  28.36 
4. Reduction  in search  time by unemployed, 
wusdU  -0.367  0.57  -0.21 
5. Reduction  in home time, 
wNdN +  wu(l  -  s)dU 
a. Less "waiting  time" by unemployed  -1.260  0.57  -0.72 
b. Entrance  to labor force  -1.058  1.01  -1.07 
c.  Higher market  hours  -0.623  2.88  -1.79 
6. Total change  in output of "final 
commodities"  ...  ...  24.57 
Sources: See Appendix B. 
a  Column (1) times column (2), except line 2, which is explained in Appendix B. 
percent reduction in unemployment is associated with a 2.7 percent increase 
in GNP, or $28.36 billion in 1971, of which about two-thirds represents  the 
extra manhours input and the remainder higher productivity. 
Lines 4 and 5 in Table 3 evaluate the effects of lower unemployment on 
the quantity of unemployed time and home time. The value of the increased 
market activity is already included in line 1; lines 4 and 5 deduct that por- 
tion of the increased value of market hours that is offset by the reduced 
value of hours devoted to search time and home time. The effect of lower 
unemployment is split into two parts; line 4 measures the value of hours 
that shift from search, and line 5a the time the unemployed spend "waiting" 
at home. The shift in hours caused by labor force entry, reported  in lines Sb 
and 5c, is exactly the same as is reported in lines lb and Ic, but it is evalu- 
ated at a much lower price. Market activity yields a marginal  product higher 
than the value of time at home because each extra market hour raises (a) the 
rent on  inframarginal hours, (b) the income of capital, and (c)  the  in- 
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The net effect of all this is that the crude calculations of the absolute cost 
of the recent recession quoted at the beginning of this paper survive nearly 
intact from the "broader view." The Okun's law elasticity, defined as the 
absolute change in final commodities divided by the level of market output 
(dZ/Q),  is reduced merely from 2.7 for the naive case that evaluates non- 
market activity at a zero price, to 2.3 when an appropriate price is applied 
to nonmarket activity. However, to maintain symmetry with the rest of the 
analysis, the elasticity should be redefined as the absolute change in final 
commodities divided by the level of final commodity production: 
(17)  dZ  dZ Q 
Since Q/Z is about 0.45, the augmented elasticity with respect to the em- 
ployment rate is about 1.0.52 
The Permanent  Case 
The evidence summarized in Table 3 indicates that a 1 percentage point 
reduction in the unemployment rate yields a net increase in output of final 
commodities of over $24 billion. But part of this large difference  in output 
is transitory; it may be considerably smaller in the long run, for two states 
of the economy that differ permanently by 1 percentage point in their un- 
employment rates. In fact there may be some positive unemployment rate 
that is "optimal" in the sense that maintaining a permanently  lower unem- 
ployment rate results in a loss in net output-considering  the loss in the 
value of nonmarket activity-rather  than a gain. The concept of an "opti- 
mum" unemployment rate, as used here, considers only the direct effects 
on  welfare of changes in unemployment and abstracts from the welfare 
cost of the extra inflation indirectly caused by lower unemployment. The 
optimum unemployment rate may be lower than the "natural"  unemploy- 
52. The estimation  of Z raises  complex questions  that are beyond the scope of this 
paper. My simple  assumptions  are that each member  of the population  above 16 years 
of age has 5,096 total hours available  per year for market  and nonmarket  production 
(allowing  10 hours  per  day  for sleep  and personal  care).  This yields  a total of 726.7  billion 
manhours,  of which 157.8  billion are devoted  to market  and 568.9  billion to nonmarket 
activity. As a rough guess (let us not debate how to value after-work  and weekend 
hours), I assume  a value of WN equal to one-third  of GNP per market  manhour  ($6.67 
times 0.33 equals $2.20). Thus Z is GNP ($1,050 billion) plus WNN  ($1,263 billion), or 
$2,313 billion. Robert J. Gordon  165 
ment rate below which inflation continuously accelerates, and hence may 
not be permanently sustainable. 
The major purposes of this section are to amend Table 3 for any differ- 
ences between the temporary and permanent cases and to indicate roughly 
where the  optimum unemployment rate might lie.  The first subsection 
below amends the estimate of labor input for the permanent case, and the 
second attempts the more difficult tasks of estimating the permanent pro- 
ductivity of that extra labor input and the change in overall productivity 
that may be brought about by a permanent  reduction in the unemployment 
rate. 
CHANGES  IN  LABOR INPUT 
Reduction  in unemployment.  Since the numeraire in both the temporary 
and permanent cases is a 1 percentage point reduction in the unemploy- 
ment rate, the extra manhours of employment caused by a reduction in 
unemployment of this size are identical in Table 3 for the temporary case 
and Table 4 for the permanent case. 
Entrance to the labor  force.  The response of labor force participation to 
changes in the unemployment rate may be either larger or smaller in the 
long run than it is in the short run. A greater long-run response may occur 
if discouraged workers leave the labor force gradually after experiencing 
unemployment. A  regression of labor force participation on the current 
unemployment rate alone (as in the regressions of Perry on which line lb 
of Table 3 is based) indicates only the instantaneous response of participa- 
tion to a change in unemployment and may understate the long-run re- 
sponse. A regression of participation on both the current unemployment 
rate and a long series of past unemployment rates yields a mean lag in re- 
sponse of 10.5 quarters.53  The total long-run response of the labor force 
53. In the fitted  regression  the dependent  variable  is"disguised  unemployment"  (UD), 
the deviation of the secondary  labor force participation  rate from its trend, and the 
independent  variable  is the official  unemployment  rate (U): 
UD =  -0.043  +  0.995UL. 
(-10.5)  (11.9) 
R2 = 0.836; standard  error  of estimate =  0.00337; sample period =  1954:1-1972:2. 
The subscript  L on the independent  variable  indicates its coefficient  is the sum of a 
series of  twenty-eight distributed lag coefficients estimated by the polynomial dis- 
tributed  lag technique,  with a fifth-degree  polynomial  constrained  to have a zero end- 
point. Details on the construction  of UD  are contained  in my "Inflation  in Recession  and 
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Table 4.  Welfare Effect of a Permanent  Decline from 5 Percent to 
4 Percent in the Unemployment  Rate, 1971 Population and 
Productivity  Levels 
Price  per  Total value 
Manhours  manhour  (billions 
(billions)  (dollars)  of dollars)s 
Item in calculation  (1)  (2)  (3) 
1. Increase  in manhours,  qdM 
a. Lower unemployment  1.618  4.90  7.93 
b. Entrance  to labor force  1.619  4.59  7.43 
c.  Higher hours  0.330  5.84  1.93 
2. Change  in productivity,  Mdq  117.700  -0.05  -5.80 
3.  Total  gain in market GNP  ...  ...  11.49 
4. Reduction in search  time by unemployed, 
wusdU  -0.367  0.57  -0.21 
5. Reduction  in home  time,  WNdN +  wu(1  -  s)dU 
a. Less "waiting  time" by unemployed  -1.260  0.57  -0.72 
b. Entrance  to labor force  -1.619  1.01  -1.64 
c.  Higher market  hours  -0.330  2.88  -0.95 
6. Total change  in output of "final 
commodities"  ...  ...  7.97 
Sources: Column (1), lines la, 2-5a, column (2), lines 4-5c, and column (3), lines 4 and 5a, are same as 
Table 3. Sources for the other lines are explained in the text. 
a.  Column (1) times column (2) except line 2, which is explained in the text. 
participation rate to  a  1 percentage point change in the unemployment 
rate is 0.995 percent, in contrast with the 0.400 percent that is estimated to 
occur within the first two years.54  Line lb of Table 4 reflects the full long- 
run effect of lower unemployment on labor force participation from my 
time series regression. 
Higher hours. Variations in hours act as a buffer to allow firms to adjust 
labor input for temporary changes in demand without incurring the sub- 
stantial costs of hiring, training, and separation involved in varying the 
number of employees. Hours would be expected to respond less sensitively 
to a permanent reduction in the unemployment rate than to a temporary 
reduction, since firms that expect the higher output level to persist will be 
54. Perry's  coefficients  used in line lb, Table 4, have a total response  in the labor 
force participation  rate of 0.65 percent.  Translated  into percentage  point  changes  in the 
labor force participation  rate, my long-run  response  is 0.61 point-from  60.39  to 61.0- 
and Perry's  is 0.40 point. Robert J. Gordon  167 
willing to hire and train additional workers in order to eliminate high-cost 
overtime  hours. But the response of hours to lower unemployment does not 
necessarily  disappear in the permanent case, because unexpected vacancies 
will still occur as a consequence of random shifts in the demand for par- 
ticular products. Firms will find these vacancies harder to fill in a low- 
unemployment economy and as a result will be forced to rely on overtime 
hours to  a greater extent than in a high-unemployment economy.  In a 
regression of hours per man on employment conditions, the long-run re- 
sponse appears to be about 53 percent of the response within the first year, 
and so line Ic of Table 4 is set at 53 percent of the same line in Table 3.55 
PRODUCTIVITY  EFFECTS 
The value of product contributed by the extra labor input in lines 1  a, Ib, 
and 1c of Table 4 cannot be measured without an estimate of the overall 
productivity effect in line 2. The previous discussion of the temporary case 
in Table 3 assumes that the output contribution of each additional worker 
who shifts from unemployment or who moves into the labor force is equal 
to the average product of all individuals in his demographic group. If these 
newly employed persons win jobs producing an output greater than aver- 
age, the effect of upgrading is treated in Table 3 as a consequence of pro- 
ductivity change rather than higher labor input. This allocation is arbi- 
trary, and has no effect on the total change in output because productivity 
change there is a residual calculated after subtraction of the contribution 
of labor input from a statistical estimate of the increase in market output 
(line 3). In the present discussion of the permanent case, however, no evi- 
55. In the fitted regression  the dependent  variable  is "the unemployment  of hours" 
(UH,  the deviation  of hours per man in the nonfarm  labor force from its trend)  and the 
independent  variable  is the gap (G) between  actual and potential  GNP: 
UH= 0.0058 +  0.1152GL. 
(5.3)  (3.6) 
R2 = 0.755; standard error of estimate = 0.00361; sample period =  1954:1-1972:2. 
The subscript  L on the independent  variable  indicates its coefficient  is the sum of a 
series of ten distributed  lag coefficients estimated by the polynomial distributed  lag 
technique,  with a third-degree  polynomial  constrained  to have a zero end-point.  Details 
on the construction  of UH  are contained in my "Inflation  in Recession and Recovery," 
Appendix  C. The sum of coefficients  in this regression  is 0.2155 after four quarters  and 
0.1152 after ten quarters.  Longer  lags did not improve  the fit. 168  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1973 
dence exists on the total output response from which to compute a pro- 
ductivity residual, and hence the  productivity effect must be measured 
directly. 
This section assumes that the effects of added labor input are limited to 
the nonfarm private business sector (NPBS) and that labor input and pro- 
ductivity are fixed in the government, farm, and (market) household sec- 
tors. Within the NPBS the major long-run effect of increased labor input 
is to increase the scale of operations. With a constant-returns  production 
function, the average productivity of labor is a function of the ratio of 
labor to capital and other factors, but not of the scale of operations. A 
lower unemployment rate stimulates investment until the capital stock is 
raised sufficiently to  equip the new workers with the same capital-labor 
ratio as those working previously. Since the age structure  of the population 
does not  change, there is no  reason to  expect a change in the average 
wealth-income ratio, and without a shift in the production function no 
change will occur in the capital-output ratio. Thus both the real wage and 
real interest rate are unaffected. The extra plants will be neither more nor 
less productive than the average, since in the long run the average age of 
capital is a function only of the depreciation rate and the growth rate of 
the economy, not of its overall scale. 
Since the higher capital stock must be maintained by larger depreciation 
deductions and returns to  owners of capital, a portion of the increase in 
output produced by the added labor input is unavailable for consumption 
(if output and capital are to  be maintained permanently at their higher 
levels), and hence is not a net social benefit. This contrasts with the tem- 
porary case in which the capital stock is fixed, depreciation is assumed to 
be fixed, and all of the increase in output is available for consumption. 
Since income to capital in 1971 was 25.9 percent of NPBS output, only the 
remaining 74.1 percent is available for private and government consump- 
tion on the assumption that the real rate of return is the same on the extra 
capital as on the preexisting capital.56 
This straightforward  conclusion that the average product of labor in the 
NPBS is insensitive to the unemployment rate in the long run implicitly 
assumes that all workers and jobs are identical and thus ignores the possi- 
bility of upgrading when the unemployment rate is reduced. Also ignored 
56. Capital  income includes  capital consumption  allowances,  corporate  profits  after 
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is the possible inefficiency of  a high-pressure economy in  reducing the 
''spare tire of the unemployed" upon whom employers can call when they 
have an unexpected increase in labor demand. These modifications are 
considered next. 
Upgrading. In his paper in this volume Okun estimates that when the 
unemployment rate declines from 5 to 4 percent the average wage paid on 
the extra jobs (45 percent of which are in durable manufacturing)  is much 
higher than the average wage received by those demographic groups (teen- 
agers and adult women) contributing most of the extra labor input. Each 
extra job pays on average 16 percent above the national average for all 
wage and salary workers, but the average wage that each worker would 
receive if he were paid the average for his demographic group is 22 percent 
below the national average.57 
If accepted at face value, Okun's estimates imply that the value of margi- 
nal product attached to  the extra manhours of labor input in Table 4 
should be 16 percent above the national average. But this exaggerates the 
benefit of a permanent  reduction in the unemployment rate for two impor- 
tant reasons. First, the increased share of high-wage durable manufactur- 
ing is a temporary cyclical phenomenon that will not last forever. Because 
the demand for producer and consumer durables behaves according to an 
accelerator  mechanism, the production of durables is always relatively  high 
when the economy is expanding relatively rapidly. But in the long run, 
when the economy is growing steadily at its potential rate of growth and 
the capital stock of consumer and producer durables has adjusted to the 
larger size of the market sector, the share of durables in output and em- 
ployment should return to its "normal" (trend) level. The industrial com- 
position of output in the long run should be insensitive to  a permanent 
change in the unemployment rate.58 
Second, the average wage paid to  a newly hired employee in durable 
manufacturing is lower than the average wage received by all employees 
in that sector. Low seniority, short previous experience, and subaverage 
ability all suggest low relative wages for the unemployed, as is confirmed 
by the result that in 1961 the unemployed earned 26 percent less on their 
57. Arthur  M. Okun, pp. 223, 224, this volume. 
58. This is not strictly correct, since a lower unemployment  rate generates  higher 
market  income, and the income elasticity of demand for each sector is not identical. 
However,  long-run  income elasticities  are not the same as the short-run  elasticities  that 
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last job than the average for all employees.59  Okun's approach allows for 
this, since the newly hired employees can push the former occupants of 
their  jobs upward in the wage structure. But even assuming that the distri- 
bution of employees across the wage structure  is insensitive in the long run 
to a change in the unemployment rate, the extra training required by the 
newly hired and newly promoted workers surely imposes a cost on society 
that Okun's approach ignores. 
The analogy with capital equipment is instructive. Lower unemployment 
raises labor input, and each new worker wili be equipped in the long run 
with the same capital-labor ratio as incumbent workers. But the after-tax 
return to  capital required to  finance the extra equipment must be sub- 
tracted from the average product of the new workers available for private 
or government consumption. In the same way, each new worker will either 
be less productive than those already working or will be equipped in the 
long run with sufficient human capital in the form of on-the-job training 
to become identical to them. In the latter case an estimate of the social cost 
of upgrading is required. Since employers did not previously choose freely 
to  hire secondary workers, two  possible  interpretations of  the cost  of 
upgrading are available: 
(a)  Secondary workers were not  previously hired, despite the  lower 
wages at which they were available, because the cost of training and up- 
grading, and the cost of shorter  job tenure expected of teenagers and adult 
women (which reduces the period of payoff from firms' training invest- 
ment), exceeded the present value of the expected profits to be made from 
the output produced by these workers. 
(b)  Secondary workers were not  previously hired because employers 
irrationally discriminated aginst them and did not know a good bargain 
when they saw one. 
The first interpretation implies that the extra wages that new workers 
receive from the upgrading process provide no net benefit to the private 
sector, because they are balanced by the cost of training and short tenure. 
The second interpretation implies that some or most of the extra wages 
represents a net benefit. Under both interpretations, all the taxes paid on 
the extra product, both by the firm and by the employee, yield a net social 
benefit. 
A growing body of research on the relationship between work experience 
59. Stein, "Work  History, Attitudes,  and Income of the Unemployed,"  p. 1410. Robert J. Gordon  171 
and earnings indicates that a major cause of the earnings gap between men 
and women is the interruption of work experience of women for spells out 
of the labor force. First, the skills women acquire depreciate faster when 
they leave the labor force, imposing a deadweight loss on society through 
a reduction in the female labor force participation rate. Second, in leaving 
the labor force women also lose the opportunity to acquirefurther experi- 
ence. Since Polachek has estimated that roughly 50 percent of the male- 
female earnings differential can be explained by the two factors together, 
a permanent increase in the labor force participation rate tends to make 
women more like men and reduces the training expense necessary to up- 
grade them into male jobs.60  To reflect  this finding I set the average  product 
of manhours permanently  shifted into employment in Table 4, lines 1  a and 
lb, at a value midway between the average product based on demographic 
weights used in Table 3 and the average product of all employees. For 
higher hours (line ic) the average product of all employees is used.61 
The "spare tire" theory. From an initial situation in which  job vacancies 
are equal to unemployment, what are the consequences of an increase in 
aggregate demand sufficient  to lower the unemployment rate by 1 percent- 
age point-for  example, from 5 percent to 4 percent?62  The number of job 
vacancies will be larger than previously, the number of applications from 
the unemployed per vacancy will decline, the duration of each vacancy 
will increase, and each job slot will suffer an increased average number of 
60. Solomon W. Polachek,  "A Comparison  of Male and Female  Post-School  Invest- 
ment Behavior  and Earnings  Using the 1967 Longitudinal  Survey  of Work Experience 
of Women  30-44 Years  of Age" (unpublished  working  paper  based  on his Ph.D. thesis, 
Columbia  University,  1973; processed). 
61. These  values  are then reduced,  in comparison  to Table 3, for the deduction  of the 
25.9 percent  required  to service additional  capital input. Polachek's  results serve as a 
reminder  not to go further  and attribute  the average  product of all employees to the 
marginal  labor force entrants.  He finds that married  female employees  who worked  in 
1966  but had quit or been  laid off later  in the year had a 12 percent  lower  wage, all other 
things held equal, than females  who worked the entire  year. "This result substantiates 
the hypothesis  that those with smaller  amounts  of human  capital  have a higher  tendency 
to leave the labor force" (p. 8). 
62. There  is no reason for the point at which vacancies  are equal to unemployment 
to signify  balance  of labor supply and demand.  Part of the available  labor supply  con- 
sists of individuals  who have declared  their  intention  to quit but are still employed  while 
they search  for a new job; some job seekers  may search  informally  while still officially 
defined  as not in the labor force; further,  many new  jobs are filled  without an employer 
ever formally  declaring  a "vacancy."  The optimum  relationship  between  vacancies  and 
unemployment  depends  on the costs and benefits  associated  with each. 172  Brookin-as  Paners on Economic Activity. 1:1973 
"vacancy  spells."  To what  extent  is the efficiency  of the economy  reduced 
by higher  vacancies?63 
The answer  requires  estimates  of the response  in the number  of vacan- 
cies  to the lower  number  of unemployed,  and  the effect  on efficiency  of each 
extra  vacancy.  While  no comprehensive  job vacancy  data are available  for 
the United States,  evidence  from the United Kingdom  suggests  that the 
vacancy-unemployment  relationship  conforms  reasonably  well to a rec- 
tangular  hyperbola: 
(18)  UV=  U'2 
where  U is unemployment,  V is total vacancies,  and U* is the level of un- 
employment  at which vacancies  and unemployment  are equal.64  As the 
unemployment  rate  declines  by successive  steps,  the increase  in the vacancy 
rate  associated  with  each  step  grows  larger.  An expansion  of labor  demand 
in slack  markets  mainly  soaks  up unemployment  without  resulting  in va- 
cancies,  whereas  in very tight markets  it raises vacancies  but has little 
effect  on rock-bottom  unemployment. 
The effect on efficiency  of a permanent  increase  in vacancies  depends 
crucially  on how accurately  labor requirements  can be predicted  in ad- 
vance. Many  job openings  occur with ample forewarning;  examples  in- 
clude  employees  needed  to staff  a new  shopping  center  or factory  scheduled 
to open on a particular  future  date, and new hires  needed  to replace  em- 
ployees  who voluntarily  quit with advance  notice or those who quit with- 
out notice  but according  to an average,  predictable,  quit  rate.  In these  cases 
personnel  offices  simply  advertise  their vacant  job slots earlier  and more 
often  in response  to lower  unemployment,  and  the social  cost of extra  ad- 
vertising  must  be relatively  small  compared  with the $17.3  billion  gain of 
lower  unemployment  listed  in section 1 of Table  4. 
The more  interesting  case is when vacancies  cannot  be foreseen,  either 
because  of stochastic  product  demand  or because  of stochastic  quits  with- 
out notice.  Firms  requiring  additional  employees  must  operate  longer  than 
they wish with unfilled  vacancies,  at the cost of lower  profits,  extra  effort 
63. My interest  in the "spare  tire" theory was stimulated  by Hall's discussion  in his 
"Turnover  in the Labor Force." 
64. See J. C. R. Dow and L. A. Dicks-Mireaux,  "The Excess Demand for Labour: 
A Study of Conditions  in Great Britain, 1946-56," Oxford  Economic  Papers, Vol. 10 
(February  1958), pp. 1-33. The assumption of a rectangular  hyperbola  was made by 
these authors  in the calculation  of an index of excess labor demand  (p. 22), and seems 
consistent with their plot of the vacancy and unemployment  series for 1951-56 (p. 4). Robert J. Gordon  173 
by employees for which they may not be compensated, unfilled orders for 
purchasers of goods, and longer queues for purchasers of services. Since 
one additional employee hired at the margin will cause only a negligible 
increase in the firm's profits, the most important consequence of unantici- 
pated vacancies is probably the increase in waiting times associated with 
additional unfilled orders and queues. 
Unfortunately, no simple analysis can provide a quantitative estimate 
of the "spare tire" effect on waiting times. Some unfilled orders may cause 
little inconvenience-for  example, those for new trucks that replace old 
ones with the same capacity. Others-for,  say, a replacement part for a 
crucial machine-may  cause an entire assembly line to be shut down if they 
remain unfilled. In the case of consumer queues, the outcome depends on 
the importance of congestion phenomena and the ability of supervisory 
personnel to fill vacant slots during rush hours without neglecting other 
important duties. It is easy to construct examples in which one vacant slot 
causes an increase in consumer waiting times worth ten to twenty times the 
wage at which the vacancy is offered.65  For the purposes of the calculations 
a parameter  (g) is defined as the ratio of the social cost of a vacancy to the 
average market product of the job slot when filled (q*). If the proportion 
of vacancies that cannot be accurately foreseen is a, the social cost imposed 
by additional unfilled vacancies is agq*dV.  The social benefit produced by 
a reduction in unemployment is -q*(l  -  k)dU, where k is the fraction of 
the extra output required to service higher capital input. The role of k is 
asymmetric, since an unforeseen vacancy does not reduce capital require- 
ments; the job slot would not exist without the capital to go with it.66 A 
65. Consider  a three-hour  rush period in a supermarket  between  4 p.m. and 7 p.m. 
when 650 customers  arrive.  Normally ten checkout  lanes are operated,  with a capacity 
of 20 customers  per hour, for a total capacity of 600 customers  in these hours. Fifty 
customers  are not processed  at 7 p.m. and must wait 15 extra minutes  (50 divided by 
capacity  of 200 per  hour).  The average  waiting  time over  the three-hour  period  is approxi- 
mately  half of 15 minutes,  or 7.5 minutes.  Now eliminate  one checkout  stand because  a 
vacancy  is unfilled.  Capacity  between  4 p.m. and 7 p.m. is reduced  to 540, so that after 
7 p.m. 110 wait an average of 37 extra minutes (110/180 capacity = 0.61 hour). The 
average  waiting  time over the three-hour  period  is approximately  half of 37 minutes,  or 
18.5 minutes. Thus the extra waiting time caused by one vacancy  is 11 minutes (0.183 
hour) times 650 customers,  or 119 hours worth $179 at $1.50 per hour  (the figure  used 
earlier  for the value of time spent in commuting).  This amount is about eighteen  times 
the wage that a part-time  employee  would have been paid for a three-hour  shift. 
66. For instance, in the supermarket  example in the previous footnote, one extra 
vacancy  implies that a cash register  and checkout  lane are standing  idle. 174  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1973 
consequence of lower unemployment is waste when capital equipment is 
underutilized due to a shortage of available labor. The net social benefit 
(B) of lower unemployment is 
(19)  B =  -  k +  ag d-U)qdU. 
Since, from (18), dV/dU  =-(U*/U)2,  equation (19) can be rewritten as 
(20)  B  -  k -  ag (u)  2q*dU. 
The optimum unemployment rate (U'), at which net social benefit is zero, 
can be written (ignoring the other components of Table 4) as 
(21)  U'-=U*  ag 
Unemployment is optimum at U* (where vacancies equal unemployment) 
if one fewer unemployed person would create output (1 -  k)q*  just suffi- 
cient to balance the inefficiency cost of one additional vacancy (agq*). If 
all vacancies are foreseen (a =  0),  or if  the  social cost  per unforeseen 
vacancy is zero (g =  0), then the optimum unemployment rate is zero. 
The net effect on productivity. The summary evaluation in Table 4 re- 
quires a numerical estimate of the percentage of job vacancies that cannot 
be foreseen (a), the social cost per unforeseen vacancy (gq*), and the un- 
employment rate at which vacancies equal unemployment (U*). I  have 
made some guesses about plausible values of these parameters,  but readers 
who have differing  intuitions are invited to substitute their own estimates. 
My inclination is to treat most vacancies as predictable and thus guess a 
rather  low value of a, for example, 0.25. As for g, the supermarket  example 
(note 65) and my own experience as a consumer suggest that the social cost 
of waiting time per vacancy may be substantially higher than its potential 
average market product in the service industries, whereas the social cost of 
manufacturing vacancies may be much less. As  a compromise, I  select 
g  =  1, so that the social cost of a vacancy is equal to the wage of the job 
when it is filled. In this case, the product ag is 0.25. Those who  prefer 
estimates of  a =  0.5  and g =  0.5  would  also  accept this value for ag. 
In the region of 4 to 5 percent unemployment, where vacancies are prob- 
ably roughly equal to unemployment, this estimate of ag implies that each 
dollar of extra product added by a reduction in the unemployment rate 
creates an external diseconomy equal to  ag/(l  -  k),  or $0.33, through 
the inefficiency of added vacancies. Thus in Table 4, line 2 of column (3) is Robert J. Gordon  175 
entered minus 33 percent of the additional product registered in line 1 of 
column (3). 
The assumptions that ag  =  0.25  and that vacancies equal unemploy- 
ment at approximately a 41/2 percent unemployment rate (U*  =  0.045) 
imply, according to  (21),  that  the  optimum unemployment rate is  2.6 
percent. Readers who prefer higher or lower values of the unknown vari- 
ables (U* and ag) are free to substitute them. 
PERMANENT  CASE:  CONCLUSION 
The bottom portion of Table 4 is similar to Table 3 and applies the same 
prices of nonmarket activity to compute the social cost  of reduced non- 
market activity when increased aggregate demand shifts some individuals 
from unemployment to employment and draws others not previously in 
the labor force into jobs. The net result is to reduce the effect on full in- 
come  of a permanent reduction in the aggregate unemployment rate to 
only $7.97 billion, or only 0.76 percent of 1971 GNP. Because the response 
of vacancies to reduced unemployment is nonlinear, this permanent out- 
put response is very sensitive to the unemployment range where the 1 per- 
centage point reduction applies, as indicated in Table 5. In that table, the 
net value of a permanent drop of 1 point in unemployment is shown start- 
ing at alternative unemployment rates. The optimum unemployment rate 
when the value of nonmarket activity is taken into account is 2.9 percent 
(from that starting point the positive contribution of a marginal reduction 
in the unemployment rate on line 3 of Table 4 just balances the negative 
elements on lines 4 and 5). 
Table 5.  Total Response of Final Commodity  Production  to a Permanent 
Reduction  of 1 Percentage Point in the Unemployment  Ratea 
Production response 
Inlitial 
unemployment  Valuie  (billionis  Percentage 
rate (percent)  of dollars)  of 1971 GNP 
3.0  -5.70  -0.54 
4.0  4.06  0.39 
5.0  7.98  0.76 
6.0  9.95  0.95 
7.0  10.99  1.05 
8.0  11.74  1.12 
Source: Estimated by author. See discussion in text. 
a.  Assumes V =  U at U* = 4.5, where V is total job vacancies, U is unemployment, and U* is the level 
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These considerations imply that the crude Okun's law approach exag- 
gerates the benefit of lower unemployment to a much greater extent in the 
long run than in the short run. While these estimates are obviously subject 
to many possible sources of error, the two most important may be the 
treatment of upgrading and the spare tire theory. Those who feel my treat- 
ment of these effects understates  the decline in productivity associated with 
lower unemployment in  the  permanent case-because,  for  example, of 
larger social benefits from upgrading or smaller estimates of  U* or ag- 
may conclude that the difference between the temporary and permanent 
cases is not as great as indicated in comparing Tables 3 and 4. Others may 
conclude the opposite. 
Another qualification is that the quantitative estimates all ignore redis- 
tributive effects of the transfer of a dollar from one individual to another. 
Lower unemployment involves a redistribution among individuals in dif- 
ferent income classes. In the temporary case  its  net  impact is  unclear, 
since both the poor unemployed and the rich owners of capital benefit from 
lower unemployment. In the permanent case the major beneficiaries are 
those relatively poor individuals who find jobs  or are upgraded, whereas 
the cost is borne mainly by the average consumer, who is inconvenienced 
by shortages and queues. Thus those who value a dollar given to a poor 
person more highly than a dollar taken from an average person should 
consider this analysis as setting an upper bound on the optimum unem- 
ployment rate. 
At this point my aim is not to propose a final answer but to identify the 
major areas on which discussion, controversy, and research should focus 
in the future. Based on the present analysis and the assumptions made 
about productivity in the permanent case, two basic conclusions emerge 
quite strongly from the analysis: 
(1) The social cost of a temporary  recession is very high, and previous 
crude estimates by  the  Okun's law  technique-that,  for  example, the 
1969-70 recession cost  "$100 billion"-emerge  almost intact after a de- 
tailed consideration of the offsetting value of nonmarket activity. 
(2) The social cost of a permanent  increase in the unemployment rate by 
1 percentage point is greatly exaggerated by the Okun's law technique, by 
a factor of about three. There is still a welfare gain from such a permanent 
reduction in unemployment, but it is less than 0.7 percent of GNP and may 
be relatively small compared with the risks of very high or accelerating 
inflation at a low unemployment rate. Robert J. Gordon  177 
APPENDIX  A 
Job Refusal  and the Search  Process 
IN  THE  TEXT,  a model of job refusal and acceptance in the search process 
was outlined. In it, the unemployed individual considering a job offer bal- 
ances the cost of refusal against the returns from refusal. The elements of 
the returns from refusal, which were only sketched there, are developed 
more formally in this appendix. The formal model is used first to derive 
several results concerning the search process and unemployment, and then 
to check some of the empirical findings presented in the text. 
Equation (12) in the text is reproduced here for convenience as (A-1): 
(A-1)  MC  =  (1 -  h)y. 
It indicates that the marginal cost of refusing a job offer at the acceptance 
wage (y) is the forgone income at that wage rate, net of taxes and earning 
costs (commuting, uniforms), which amount to a fraction (h) of the forgone 
income. 
In considering a job offer, the unemployed individual balances the cost 
of refusal given by (A-1) against the marginal return of refusal, which con- 
sists of several elements. The list of elements used here is more general 
than that in the recent literature on "the economics of search" in that it 
allows for both searching and waiting during unemployment. 
1. If a worker has been laid off from his previous job and estimates a 
probability, 3, of being rehired at his old job at his previous wage rate, wo, 
the present value of the extra future returns from being rehired compared 
with acceptance of a job offer at the acceptance wage, y, is 
Rn(1  -h)j(wo  -y), 
where Rn  is a discount factor.1 If the probability A is positive, this return 
1. The discount  factor  depends  on the discount  rate  (r) and the expected  tenure  of the 
job, n: 
Rn = 5 1  +) 
This definition  of the discount  factor  assumes  that the receipt  of 03'O  when the  job offer  is 
refused begins one time interval  later than the receipt of y, should the job offer be ac- 178  Brookings Pavers on Economic Activity. 1:1973 
from rehire will be received whether or not the individual looks for a job. 
While rehiring is very common for those who have been laid off, 3 is zero 
for a substantial fraction of the unemployed who have just entered or re- 
entered the labor force, who quit their previous jobs, or who were laid off 
without prospect of  a recall, because, say, of unsatisfactory job  perfor- 
mance or permanent closing of a plant.2 
2.  If he devotes his time to  search, an unemployed individual faces a 
probability distribution of wage offers. Some offers will be below the mini- 
mum acceptance wage (y) and will not be accepted. The mean value of the 
acceptable offers (those above y) is x, so that if an acceptable offer is re- 
ceived, the extra wage per period expected from search, after taxes and 
earnings costs, is (1 -  h)(x -  y). The probability that an acceptable offer 
will be received during the next period is a,, times (1 - ,),  the probability 
that rehire will not occur. An increase in the fraction of unemployed time 
devoted to search (s) raises the probability (ax) of receiving an offer.3  Thus 
the present value of the returns to search is R(1  -  h)(1 - O3)a,(x -  y). 
3.  When a job offer is refused, many of the unemployed receive unem- 
ployment compensation (b) which is independent of the fraction of time 
devoted to search, as long as there is some minimum amount. 
4.  Search requires expenditures on  goods  and services-shoe  leather, 
bus fares, and telephone calls-which  are a positive function of the fraction 
of unemployed time devoted to search, c8. 
5.  Finally, a decision not to  search or to  spend only a fraction (s) in 
search activity allows the consumption of home time, which is valued at 
(1  -  S)WN. 
The "marginal revenue" for the next period implied by a decision to 
refuse a job offer is the sum of the five elements on this list:4 
cepted. This assumption  understates  the return  from  job refusal  if, for example,  rehire 
(with probability  fi) occurs in the middle of the search  interval, where the interval to 
which ( applies is the period between  job offers if the unemployed  individual  were to 
search  for a job. Since wo > y, this component  of the return  from  job refusal  is positive. 
2. In 1971, 46.3 percent  of the unemployed  cited "lost last job" as the reason  for un- 
employment  (Manpower Report of the President,  1972, Table  A-21).  In the more pros- 
perous period of 1969, the percentage  was 35.9 (Manpower  Report,  1970, Table A-19). 
3.  aY  is positive and a?'  is negative if there are diminishing  returns to  an  increase  in 
the fraction  of time devoted to search. 
4. Equations  (A-1) and (A-2) are substantially  elaborated  versions of equation (12) 
in Dale T. Mortensen,  "Job Search, the Duration of Unemployment,  and the Phillips 
Curve," American  Economic  Review, Vol. 60 (December 1970), p. 851. They extend 
Mortensen's  equation to consider  finite  job tenure, taxes, earning  costs, layoffs, direct Rnhbrt J.  Gnrdnn  179 
(A-2)  MR =  R(1  -  h)7(wo  -  y) +  (1 -  3)ax(x -  y)] 
+  b -  cS +  wN(  -  s). 
The minimum wage (y) required for an offer to be acceptable is set at the 
level that equates marginal cost in (A-1) with marginal revenue in (A-2). 
When this equality is solved for y, 
A  RJ(I -  h)[j3wo  +  (1 -  3)cx8x]  +  b -  c8  +  WN(l  -  s)  (  ~~  ) Y  (1--h)  {  I +  Rn  [o +  (I1-  O)a8]1 
If the acceptance wage is set too high, unemployment will continue too long 
as jobs are refused that yield a higher wage than the returns  from continued 
search. If the acceptance wage is set too low, an offer will be accepted too 
early, and the opportunity to earn a higher income by waiting for a better 
job will be lost. 
The price of  unemployed time (wu) required for the purpose of  this 
paper is the return to society of job refusal, consisting of the return to the 
unemployed individual minus the unemployment benefits paid by the rest 
of society to the unemployed. The term wu can thus be expressed as either 
marginal cost reduced by unemployment benefits, as it was in (13), or as 
marginal revenue reduced by unemployment benefits: 
(A-4)  wu =  R.(1  -  h)[(wo  -  y) +  (1 -  fO)a(x  -  y)]  -  c +  wN(1  -  s). 
The minimum acceptable wage set by an unemployed individual defines 
his private opportunity cost in activities other than work; but his social 
opportunity cost is less than this by the amount of unemployment com- 
pensation, since his acceptance of a job confers on society an external bene- 
fit in the form of lower taxes to finance unemployment compensation. A 
possible "congestion" effect that further reduces the social relative to the 
private opportunity cost would occur if the decision to refuse a job reduces 
the probability of finding a job for others, but this is not taken into account 
here. 
A  number of  interesting conclusions can be  derived from (A-3)  and 
(A-4). If the expected probability of rehire (A)  is sufficiently  high, it will be 
rational for the unemployed individual to abstain entirely from search and 
enjoy an income of b +  WN while he waits for recall to his old job.  No 
search costs, the division between searching  and waiting, and the role of home time 
during  waiting. I am extremely  grateful  to Mortensen  for his suggestions  on the treat- 
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search will be  undertaken if  its  expected gains  relative to  waiting are 
negative: 
(A-5)  RJI  -  h)(1 -  f)a8(x -  y)  -  c8  - swN  <  0. 
The condition in (A-5) can be rearranged  to state that no search will occur 
if the difference between the expected wage offer (x) and the acceptance 
wage (y) is insufficient to cover the cost of search and the forgone home 
time during search: 
(A-6)  x-Y  < 
C8 + 
SW(IJ 
Any of the following tend to increase the likelihood that no search will 
occur: an increase in the price of home time (wN),  of the tax rate (h), of 
unemployment benefits (b), of direct search costs (c8), and of the probabil- 
ity of recall (d)-or  a reduction in the discount factor (Rn) or the expected 
wage in a new job (x).5 
Similarly, from (A-3) a list can be constructed of changes that raise the 
acceptance wage: an increase in the tax rate or earnings costs (which raise 
the relative size of untaxed home time and unemployment compensation), 
in the price of home time, in unemployment benefits, in the probability of 
recall, in the probability of finding a new job,  or in the mean wage ex- 
pected on a new job.  Presumably a recession reduces the last three items 
on this list and hence reduces the acceptance wage for any given duration 
of unemployment. If the after-tax acceptance wage of those who do not 
expect recall (j  =  0) and who are ineligible for unemployment compensa- 
tion (b =  0) drops below the price of home time (wN),  they will leave the 
labor force. This explains why, in cyclical recessions, adult women and 
teenagers tend to exit from the labor force to a much greater extent than 
adult men. 
5. The conditions are obtained by substituting  the expression  for y from (A-3) into 
(A-6) and rearranging: 
x  < Wo(1  +  R3)  ?  1-  h)(1 +  R3)] 
?  -  h)(1 -  p) 
s +  R[a(1-l)  +  Os] )  + NaR(1  -h)(1  -  )(1  +  RA) 
Since wo,  b, c, and WN are multiplied  by positive  terms,  an increase  in each will raise the 
likelihood of no search.  The tax term (h) appears only in the denominator  and has a 
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In the text, wu was estimated from the marginal cost of job refusal given 
by equation (13). A cross-check can now be provided from a rough esti- 
mate of the marginal revenue of job refusal, calculated using (A-4): 
(A-7)  Wu 
wo(1 -  h) 
Rn  (wo  - Y) + (  -  )Ox  -  y)]  +  WN(1  -  S)  -  c 
Wo  +  wo((-h) 
Since it was estimated in the text that the left-hand side of (A-7), the ratio 
of the price of unemployed time to the after-tax previous wage, is equal to 
0.342, the aim here is plausible values for the right-hand side that will 
satisfy  the  equality.  Table  A-1  provides  estimates  of  all  values  but 
WN(l  -  s), the price of home time per month for those hours remaining 
after search is completed. This value must be $54.76 to satisfy (A-7), or 
about 20.6 percent of the previous after-tax wage. 
The least reliable estimates in Table A-I are likely to be those for search 
Table A-1.  Values of the Components  of Marginal Revenue  from Job 
Refusal, as Derived from Equation (A-7) 
Component of equation (A-7)  Value 
1. Discount factor, Rn  10.6 
2. Probability  of rehire,  0.122 
3. Difference  between  previous  wage (Wo)  and acceptance  wage (y), 
divided  by previous  wage, (wo -  y)/wo  0.172 
4. Probability  of finding  job, a.  0.295 
5. Difference  between  expected  wage offer (x) and acceptance  wage, 
divided  by previous  wage, (x -  y)/wo  0.086 
6. Direct cost of search,  per month, c  $85.14 
7. Price of unemployed  time, per month, wu  $90.69 
8. After-tax  wage, (1 -  h)wo  $265.20 
9. Ratio of value of home time, net of search,  to previous  after-tax  wage, 
WN(1  -S)  WU +  C 
Rn 
(WO  Y)  +  (1  -  O)a(x  -Y)1 
wo(l  -h)  wo(l  -h)  L  wO  ' 
where  WN  =  price of home time  0.206 
10.  Implied value, net of search, of home time,  per month,  wN(l  -  s)  $54.76 
Source: See equation (A-7) and Appendix B. 182  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1973 
cost (c), the expected wage (x),  and the expected rehire probability (A). 
Stephenson's questionnaire estimate of c (Table A-1, line 6), is based on 
males 18-21 and may understate the direct search costs of all unemployed 
individuals; if so, it leads to an underestimate of wN(l -  s). The expected 
wage offer (x) in Table A-1 is assumed to lie halfway between the accep- 
tance wage (y) and the previous wage (wo). If instead the expected wage 
offer is equal to the previous wage, the resulting value of wN(l  -  s) drops 
from 0.206 of the previous wage to zero. If, on the other hand, individuals 
are pessimistic and estimate the expected rehire probability as only half 
the actual value used in Table A-1, then wN(l  -  s)  increases from 0.206 
of the previous wage to 0.300. This range of estimates of wN(l  -  s)  can 
be compared with the estimate of 0.338 arrived at from direct evidence on 
the price of home time given in the text. 
APPENDIX  B 
Table  Sources  and Notes 
THE SOURCES FOR several of the tables are given below. The first  numeral  in 
an entry refers to the line number of the table. The number in parentheses 
refers to the column number. The material that follows refers to the source 
and explains any qualifications to the data. 
Table 1 
1. Dorsey. (1) John W. Dorsey,  "The Mack Case: A Study in Unem- 
ployment," in  Otto  Eckstein (ed.),  Studies in the Economics of Income 
Maintenance (Brookings Institution, 1967), pp.  175-248. (5) Total listed 
in Table A-2, p. 235. (6) A very small number of women is included, see 
p. 200. (7) p. 203. (8)  $2.46 per hour, or $98.40 for a forty-hour week, 
calculated from frequency distribution in Table A-il,  p. 240. w0 =  $137, 
p. 203. (10) w1 =  $85, w0 =  $137, p. 203. (11) Median w1 within six weeks 
(0.75 month) was $93; median w1  for six to ten months (eight months) was 
$80. The linear rate of decline was (93 -  80)/93 divided by 7.25 months = 
0.140/7.25  =  1.93 percent. (12) p. 203. Robert J. Gordon  183 
2.  Folk and Hartman. (1) Hugh Folk and Paul Hartman, Pensions and 
Severance Pay for  Displaced Defense  Workers (U.S.  Arms Control and 
Disarmament Agency,  1969). (5) p. 95. (7) Computed from bottom line, 
Table IV-8, p.  113. (8) Computed from frequency distribution in Table 
IV-9, p. 114. (10) Computed from last column, Table IV-8, p. 113. 
3. Kasper. (1) Hirschel Kasper, "The Asking Price of Labor and the 
Duration of Unemployment," Review of Economics  and Statistics, Vol. 49 
(May 1967), pp. 165-72. (5) p. 167. (7)-(9) p. 169. 
4. Perrella. (1) Vera C. Perrella, "Young Workers and Their Earnings," 
Monthly Labor Review, Vol. 94 (July 1971), pp. 3-11. (5) Sample size not 
listed in article. (7) and (8) Table 1, p. 4. 
5.  Sheppard and Belitsky.  (1)  Harold  L.  Sheppard and  A.  Harvey 
Belitsky, The Job Hunt: Job-Seeking  Behavior  of Unemployed  Workers  in a 
Local Economy  (Johns Hopkins Press, 1966). (5) Table 2-1, p. 18. (7) Table 
2-7, p. 28. (8) p. 40. (10) Table 2-7, p. 28. 
6.  Stephenson.  (1) Stanley P. Stephenson, Jr., "The Economics of Job 
Search: A Biracial Analysis of Youth Job Search Behavior" (paper pre- 
sented at the 1972 annual meeting of the Econometric Society; processed). 
(5) p. 17. (7) and (8) p. 29. (9) Calculated from regression coefficient, p. 26. 
7.  Wilcock and Franke. (1) Richard C. Wilcock and Walter H. Franke, 
Unwanted Workers: Permanent Layoffs  and Long-term  Unemployment 
(Free Press of Glencoe,  1963). (5) Table 5, p. 49. (7) p.  143. (10) p.  144. 
(12) Median weekly amount of unemployment benefits was between $32 
and $33, from p. 71. Converted to an hourly rate assuming 40 hours per 
week. 
Table 2 
1. Ashenfelter-Heckman,  line la. (1) Orley Ashenfelter and James Heck- 
man, "The Estimation of Income and Substitution Effects in a Model of 
Family Labor Supply," unpublished manuscript (forthcoming in Econo- 
metrica). Dependent variable is the proportion of the year at work, as- 
sumed to equal 1.0 at 2,000 hours. (4) Calculated from column (7) and 
i  =  3.2, Hi =  682. (5) Calculated from columns (7) and (8) and means 
reported in Table 1. (7) and (8) Table 4, p. 13. 
Heckman, line lb.  (1) James Heckman, "Shadow Prices, Market Wages, 
and Labor Supply" (National  Bureau of  Economic  Research, October 184  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1973 
1972; processed). (4) Reduction of work to 1,050 hours annually would re- 
duce the wage 66 percent (from column 5) to $832 per year, or $0.79 per 
hour. (5) Table 1, p. 15, evaluated at 1,050 hours per year. See column (7). 
(7) Table 1, p. 15, presents an estimate that a 6.3 percent change in wi is 
associated with a 100-hour change in annual hours. Evaluated for Wi  = 
$2.33 (Robert E. Hall, "Wages, Income and Hours of Work in the U.S. 
Labor Force," in Glen G. Cain and Harold W. Watts (eds.), Labor Supply 
and Income Maintenance,  forthcoming) and Hi =  1,050 hours. 
Leibowitz, line ic.  (1) Arleen Leibowitz, "Education and the Allocation 
of  Women's Time" (National  Bureau of  Economic Research, no  date; 
processed). (4) See line la,  column (4). (5) p.  13. (7) Evaluated at mean 
hours of work, H, from line la, column (4). 
2.  Ashenfelter-Heckman,  line 2a. (1) Same as line la, column (1). (5) and 
(6) Same as line la, columns (5) and (6). (7) and (8) Table 4, p. 13. 
Ashenfelter-Heckman,  line 2b. (1) Orley Ashenfelter and James Heck- 
man,  "Estimating Labor Supply Functions," in Cain and Watts (eds.), 
Labor Supply and Income Maintenance. (5) Reported on p.  17 of typed 
manuscript. (7) Calculated from (5) with H-  =  2,272, W  =  8.87. 
Hall, line 2c. (1) Hall,  "Wages, Income and Hours of Work." Hourly 
wage converted to annual earnings at 2,000 hours per year. (7) "The hypoth- 
esis that wage effects are absent for the 20-59 age group cannot be rejected" 
(quotation from manuscript).  The figure in the table is derived by fitting a 
straight line visually to Figure 8-3 above $2.00 per hour. 
Table 3 
Lower unemployment,  line la.  (1) One percentage point  of unemploy- 
ment =  841,000 additional unemployed, calculated from Economic  Report 
of the  President,  January  1973, Table C-24.1  Average hours per man in 1971 
in private nonagricultural industries were 37.0 per week times 52 weeks 
(Economic Report, 1973, Table  C-30). (2)  Private output per manhour 
equals total private product (Economic Report, 1973, Table C-9) divided 
by product  of  private employees (Survey of  Current Business, Vol.  52, 
July 1972, Table 6.3) and average hours per man times 52 weeks. This is 
1. Hereafter  this document  will be referred  to as Economic  Report,  followed by the 
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then adjusted for the evidence, cited above, that the average wage of the 
unemployed in 1971 was 0.690 of the employed. 
Entrance to labor  force,  line lb.  (1) Coefficients of labor force response 
to a change in the aggregate unemployment rate from George L. Perry, 
"Labor Force Structure, Potential Output, and Productivity," Brookings 
Papers on Economic  Activity (3:1971), p. 564. 1971 labor force weights from 
Manpower Report of the President, 1972, Tables A-3 and A-4.2 (2) Perry 
presents weights of the average weekly relative earnings by the same demo- 
graphic groups in his earlier article, "Changing Labor Markets and Infla- 
tion," BPEA (3:1970), p. 440. These weights imply that groups that enter 
the labor force earn only 58.6 percent of the average for all employees. The 
figure in this table is private product per manhour times 0.586. 
Higher hours, line ic.  (1) The response of hours to cyclical unemploy- 
ment is estimated in Perry, "Labor Force Structure,"  p. 541. This response 
of 0.196 hours is multiplied by 1971 private employment, from Survey of 
Current  Business (July 1972), Table 6.3. (2) Total private GNP per man- 
hour, from notes to line la, column (2). 
2.  Increase in productivity, line 2. (1) Private manhours from average 
hours per man in line 1  a times 52 weeks times number of employees, in Sur- 
vey of Current  Business (July 1972), Table 6.3. (2) Column (3) divided by 
column (1). (3) Line 3, column (3), minus the sum of lines la, Ib, and Ic for 
column (3). 
3.  Market GNP, line 3. (3) Perry, "Labor Force Structure,"  p. 557, esti- 
mates the Okun's law multiplier to be 2.7. Thus a 1 percentage point re- 
duction in unemployment is  associated with 2.7 percent extra GNP  at 
current prices. 
4.  Reduced search time, line 4. (1) Line la,  column (1) times ratio of 
search time to  workweek (8.4/37.0).  (2)  $20.93 per week divided by  a 
37.0-hour workweek equals $0.57 per hour. 
5.  Reduced waiting time, line 5a. (1) The negative of line la, column (1) 
minus line 4, column (1). (2) Same as line 4, column (2). 
Entrance to labor  force,  line 5b. (1) Copied from line  lb,  column (1). 
(2) Estimated average price of home time for women, men, and teenagers 
(from text  discussion  above)  was  weighted together with demographic 
weights corresponding to cyclical response of these groups to changes in 
2. These documents are hereafter referred to  as  BPEA and Manpower  Report, 
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the labor force, from the same source used in line lb, column (1). For the 
purpose of this calculation the price of time of those in the 20-24  age 
group was assumed to be midway between the values for teenagers and 
adults of each sex. 
Higher market hours, line 5c.  (1) Line Ic, column (1). (2) Assumed to 
occur at the margin. Evaluated at 1971 average hourly wage, adjusted for 
fringe benefits and taxes, but not commuting costs. 
6. Total, line 6.  Sum of lines 3-5. 
Table A-1 
1. Discount  factor. The expected length of job tenure is set at the average 
interval between unemployment spells, which is approximately  equal to the 
inverse of the average number of spells per year (0.98), calculated as a 
weighted average of the individual demographic group data for spells per 
year for a 6.0 percent aggregate unemployment rate presented by George 
L.  Perry, "Unemployment  Flows  in  the  U.S.  Labor  Market"  BPEA 
(2:1972), Table 3, p. 259, when combined with 1971 unemployment weights 
from Manpower  Report, 1972, Table A-15. At a 2 percent monthly discount 
rate, which seems plausible for the uncreditworthy  unemployed, Rn =  10 6. 
2.  Expected rehire  probability. This estimate is the product of 0.37, the 
percent of  the  unemployed who  were rehired in  1971, and 0.332,  the 
monthly probability of rehire for this group. The first figure is derived from 
Manpower  Report, 1972, Tables A-21 and C-10. Table A-21 shows that in 
1971, 46.3 percent of the unemployed lost their last job. It is assumed that 
the group expecting recall is equal to the actual fraction of layoffs that was 
rehired in manufacturing. For the years 1957-71, rehires, which can be 
approximated by accessions minus new hires, equaled on average 0.8 of 
layoffs in manufacturing (Table C-10) (0.8 X 0.463 =  0.370). The aver- 
age duration of unemployment for those who lost their last job was 3.01 
months in 1971, implying a monthly A of 0.332 (Manpower Report, 1972, 
Tables A-21 and A-22) for those expecting recall (0.370 X 0.332 =  0.122). 
3.  Difference between previous wage and acceptance wage, divided by 
previous wage. The calculation of wu in the previous text discussion esti- 
mated y/wo as 0.828. Thus (wo -  y)/wo  =  0.172. 
4. Probability of finding a job. This figure is a weighted average of the 
separate probabilities for six age-sex groups provided in Perry, "Unem- Robert J. Gordon  187 
ployment Flows," Table 8, p. 277. Weights are the shares of each group in 
1971 unemployment, from Manpower Report, 1972, Table A-15.  Perry's 
probabilities are presented for whites and nonwhites separately; in my cal- 
culation, weights for all unemployed workers (for six age-sex groups) are 
applied to the white probabilities only, since separate share data for whites 
and nonwhites were not available. Also the probability data for adults cover 
the 25-29 age group, whereas the share data include the 25-64 group. 
5.  Difference between expected wage offer and acceptance wage, divided 
by previous wage. The mean wage offer is assumed to be halfway between 
the previous wage and the acceptance wage, so this line equals one-half of 
line 3. 
6.  Direct search cost. Stanley P. Stephenson, Jr., has provided me with 
unpublished results of his extensive thesis questionnaire for teenage males 
(cited in Table 1, line 6), separated for whites and blacks. Direct search 
cost includes travel cost (a sum weighted by mode, distance, and cost), 
cost of letters, cost of phone calls, expected moving costs, expected private 
agency costs, and other expected costs. The weekly results are converted 
to  monthly values and weighted by the  1971 U.S.  shares of whites and 
blacks in total unemployment. 
7 and 8.  Estimated in previous text discussion. 
Table  C-1 
Number of unemployed, columns (1) and (3). Manpower Report, 1972, 
Table A-21, does not separate the group whose unemployment has been 
of  15 weeks' duration and over between groups with 15-26 and over 26 
weeks' duration, whereas Table A-22 separates these two duration groups 
but does not give separate figures by reason of unemployment. The 15 and 
over group was separated  into 15-26 and over 26 for recalls and nonrecalls 
by assuming that the proportion of recalls in the total 15 and over group 
(from Table A-21) also represented the proportion in the separate 15-26 
and over 26 subgroups. 
Visits, columns (2) and (4).  For each group  1.16 Employment Service 
visits are added in the first month (see Appendix C). Male nonrecall com- 
pany visits are estimated from exponential distribution, equation (a) in 
Appendix C, note 5, as follows. All duration groups made 8.87 company 
visits in the first month (this is the estimate of the exponential distribution 188  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1973 
for a 2.0 week duration), plus the 1.16 Employment Service visits, or a total 
of 10.03 visits in the first month. The average duration in the 5-14 group 
was assumed to be 9.5 weeks. For this group the average number of com- 
pany visits beyond the first month is given by the intersection of the expo- 
nential distribution at 9.5 weeks (5.66). The average of  10.03 visits per 
month for the first four weeks and 5.66 per month for the next 5.5 weeks is 
7.79, the figure shown in column (4), line lb. An analogous procedure was 
followed for the  15-26 and over 26 groups. Figures on female company 
visits are all equal to 43 percent of the equivalent male figures (see text dis- 
cussion above). Figures in column (3) for recalls are in each case estimated 
by exactly the same procedure, based on equation (b) in the previous foot- 
note instead of (a). 
APPENDIX  C 
Evidence  on Hours Spent in Search  Activity 
AN  EXTENSIVE BATTERY  of  questions on job-finding techniques was in- 
cluded in the  Sheppard-Belitsky and Stephenson surveys (see Table  1), 
asking about the use of different search techniques and the number of 
visits to company hiring gates. Of the male blue-coliar respondents in the 
Sheppard-Belitsky  survey  who had completed their spells of unemployment, 
those finding new jobs each visited an average of 13.6 companies, whereas 
those who had been laid off and were recalled to their original jobs visited 
8.5 (thus contradicting the implication of previous analysis that potential 
recalls do not engage in search activity).' The frequency distribution of 
visits per month appears to have a steep negative slope, since those finding 
new jobs visited 8.9 companies in the first month of unemployment (5.6 
for recalls).2 Thus for both  groups, 66 percent of the visits were made 
1. Harold L. Sheppard  and A. Harvey  Belitsky,  The  Job Hunt:  Job-Seeking  Behavior 
of  Unemployed  Workers  in a Local Economy (Johns Hopkins Press, 1965), Table 
3-18, p. 55, and p. 56. 
2. Ibid., p. 81; 41 percent  started  their  job search  on or before  the first day of unem- 
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during the first month of unemployment, even though 46 percent of the 
new-job group were unemployed for 5 or more weeks with an average dura- 
tion of 20.0 weeks.3 Spreading the remaining 34 percent of the visits over 
the total unemployment period of this group implies an average of only 
3.0 visits per month beyond the first month.4 For the recall group the 
equivalent figure is 2.4 per month beyond the first month.5 While no de- 
tails are available for the women in the sample, their average number of 
total visits per spell was only 43 percent of the male average.6 
The  other  important  search  technique  identified  by  the  Sheppard- 
Belitsky sample was reliance on the State Employment Service, which 84 
percent of the respondents visited.7 Unfortunately, the number of visits to 
the service is not reported, but rather the "number of types of help" re- 
ceived there. From the published distribution, I estimate an average of 
1.16 trips to the service during a spell of unemployment for purposes other 
than regular reporting for unemployment benefits.8 If all trips for these 
3. Ibid.,  Table 2-4, p. 24. The 1963  and 1964  shares  of each duration  group  are listed 
separately.  Since the survey  extended  from January  1, 1963,  to March  31, 1964,  average 
shares  of each duration  group  for the entire  period  are estimated  by applying  weights  of 
0.8 to 1963 and 0.2 to 1964.  The assumed  average  durations  are 9.5 weeks for the 5-14 
week group,  20.5 weeks for the 15-26 week group, and 35 weeks for the over 26 weeks 
group. 
4. Of the 128  individuals  in the new-job  group,  46  percentwere  unemployed  an average 
of 20 weeks,  or an average  of 15 weeks  beyond the first month of unemployment.  Thus 
883 man-weeks  of search  activity  accounted  for only 602 companiy  visits  (128 individuals 
times the 4.7 visits not accounted  for by search  in the first month). 
5. These results  are roughly  consistent  with the following exponential  functions for 
the number  of visits per month (V): 
(a)  V =  10e-0  6t (those finding new  jobs) 
(b)  V = 6.3e 0?6t  (recalls), 
where  t is the average  number  of weeks  of unemployment  of each duration  group.  These 
functions  were fitted (by eye) to the distribution  of duration  groups  on the assumption 
of a 2.0 week average duration of the group unemployed  less than 5 weeks, and the 
average  durations  assumed  above for the three groups  unemployed  more than 5 weeks. 
6. Ibid.,  Table 3-16, p. 53. 
7. Ibid., Table 3-9, p. 45. The equivalent  figure  for the United States as a whole in 
1971  was only 30.8 percent,  from  Table 1 in Thomas  F. Bradshaw,  "Jobseeking  Methods 
Used by Unemployed  Workers,"  Monthly  Labor  Review,  Vol. 96 (February  1973), pp. 
35-40. Sheppard  and Belitsky  found that only 34 percent  spontaneously  reported  use of 
the State Employment  Service, but 84 percent  reported  such use when asked directly, 
and 49 percent  said that the service was the first place visited. Job Hunt, p. 46, and 
Table 3-12, p. 48. 
8. Ibid., Table 3-15, p. 52, shows a distribution  for "types of help received"  ranging 
from zero to three or more. Since an individual  checking  with the agency who received 190  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1973 
other purposes are assumed to have been made during the first month of 
unemployment, total trips including both company and Employment Ser- 
vice visits total  10.1 in the first month and 3.0 per month in subsequent 
months for males finding new jobs (6.8 and 2.4, respectively, for recalls). 
There are also an estimated 2 required reporting visits per month for the 
subset of the unemployed who are eligible for benefits.9 
The other job sources reported by a majority of the Sheppard-Belitsky 
sample were newspaper ads and "friends and relatives." Others were used 
by only a small minority of the sample.10  In the absence of detailed infor- 
mation I am inclined to add one hour per weekday to the total of search 
time, mainly for extra newspaper reading (beyond the home time normally 
devoted to  newspapers by  employed  individuals), and planning search 
activities. The number of visits to  private employment agencies will be 
assumed to equal those made to the State Employment Service." 
As a crude approximation I assume that the time devoted to any other 
techniques by the entire sample just  balances the time saved by the 28 
percent minority who did not visit any companies at all, and thus the data 
on reported company visits will be applied to all of the unemployed. This 
practice probably overstates the intensity of search activity, since a full 56 
percent of male blue-collar workers in the sample reemployed at new jobs 
first heard about those jobs from friends, relatives, or other workers, and 
many of them may not have traveled farther than their own telephones.12 
no help was probably  just registering  for unemployment  benefits,  I assume  one trip for 
the "zero types" group, and one trip per type of help for the remainder.  These figures 
apply to both men and women, who reported  an identical extent of use (84 percent). 
Ibid., Table 3-9, p. 45. 
9. The present  practice  in Illinois requires  biweekly  reporting  in person to maintain 
eligibility  for unemployment  benefits.  The problem of benefit termination  after six or 
nine months  is ignored,  because of the relatively  small number of long-duration  unem- 
ployed in the relatively  prosperous  economic environment  that is the subject of this 
paper. 
10. No information  on intensity of use is available  for techniques  other than com- 
pany  visits.  The percentages  of blue-collar  workers  reporting  use of the techniques  (when 
directly asked) were, for newspaper ads (88), Employment  Service (84), friends and 
relatives  (81), company  hiring  gate (76), government  agencies  (31), unions (24), religious 
and fraternal  organizations  (23), and private  employment  agencies  (19). Ibid.,  Table 3-11, 
p. 47. 
11. Since the fraction using private agencies and the State Service sum to  unity 
(previous  footnote), this is accomplished  by applying  the previously  estimated  Employ- 
ment Service  visits to the entire sample instead of only 84 percent. 
12. Sheppard  and Belitsky,  Table 4-11, p. 89. The rest of the distribution  on "where 
first  heard  ofjob" is direct  company  applications  (15 percent),  State  Employment  Service 
(14 percent),  unions (6 percent),  newspaper  ads (4 percent),  other (4 percent). Robert J. Gordon  191 
An estimate of total hours devoted to  search requires information on 
the number of hours devoted to  each company or Employment Service 
visit, including transportation time. Only anecdotal evidence is available 
to help establish a plausible guess. In his study of unemployment in the 
Great Depression, Bakke provides case studies of search techniques for 
the workers, including a daily diary for one man. His entries refer to be- 
tween two  and six company visits per morning, with no  activity in the 
afternoon: "The first few days I hadn't the heart for more than a couple 
of tries a morning. I'm getting hardened to the word 'No' now, though, 
and can stick it the most of the morning."13  Most visits were short, and 
the most time-consuming part of a visit was the early-morning  wait caused 
by the desire to  be first in line. Since transport cost  was minimized by 
visits to neighboring companies on the same day, significant travel time 
for search activity was concentrated at the beginning and end of each day 
and probably approximated commuting time.14 Two hours per company 
visit seems a reasonable guess in light of these anecdotes and allows for 
half an hour each of travel and waiting, with an hour for applications, 
tests, and interviews. 
Thus far the analysis has identified five components that may be used 
for a rough estimate of hours of search in the U.S. economy: (1) an expo- 
nential distribution of company visits for adult males, with the same dis- 
tributions but smaller multiplicative constant terms for females; (2)  an 
estimate of 1.16 Employment Service visits for unemployed individuals in 
all demographic groups; (3) an average of 2 unemployment benefit visits 
per month-which  must be weighted by the fraction of the U.S.  unem- 
ployed receiving benefits (0.43); (4) an extra hour per day for newspaper 
reading and planning (proportionately less here for recalls); and (5) an 
average of two hours per visit. These assumptions are combined in Table 
C-I with the 1971 U.S. distribution of unemployment by demographic and 
13. E. Wight Bakke, The Unemployed  Worker:  A Study of the Task of Making a 
Living  Without  a Job (Yale University  Press  for the Institute  of Human  Relations, 1940), 
p. 171. 
14. "Most men lived considerable distances from the center of employment and 
every time they looked for a job, they had to spend at least 10 cents on carfare.  When 
one realizes  that 10 cents would buy an additional  quart  of milk, one understands  why 
many hesitated  before starting out. If they were to make a day of job hunting, they 
would need another  10 cents for a bite of lunch....  He usually  managed  to come home 
by noon in order  to save lunch money and because  he realized  that the afternoon  was 
not a good time for job hunting."  Eli Ginzberg,  The Unemployed  (Harper, 1943), pp. 
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Table C-1. Number of Unemployed, and Average Company  and 
Employment  Service Visits per Unemployed  Person per Month, 
by Duration of Unemployment  and Sex, and Estimate of Total 
Search Time, 1971 
Recalls  Nonrecalls 
Number  Number 
of unem-  of unem- 
ployed  Visits  ployed  Visits  Total 
(thou-  per  (thou-  per  unem- 
sands)  nmonith  sands)  month  ployed 
Descriptionz  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
Duration  of unemploymenit  (weeks) 
Males, aged 20 and over 
a. 0-4  385  6.75  399  10.03  784 
b. 5-14  363  5.14  315  7.79  678 
c.  15-26  195  3.75  144  5.80  339 
d. Over 26  164  2.73  120  4.25  284 
Females,  aged 20 and over 
a. 0-4  193  3.56  578  4.97  771 
b. 5-14  182  2.51  316  3.67  498 
c.  15-26  101  1.75  111  2.64  212 
d. Over 26  81  1.26  88  1.91  169 
Males and females,  total  1,664  2,071  3,735 
Number  of visits 
Employment-related  ...  4.24  ...  5.93  5.17 
Unemployment  benefit-related  ...  0.86  ...  0.86  0.86 
Total visits  ...  5.10  ...  6.79  6.03 
Per week  Per week Per week 
Search  time  (hours)  (hours)  (hours) 
Direct job  search  ...  2.35  ...  3.13  2.78 
Newspaper  and planning time  ...  3.75  ...  5.00  4.44 
Total  search time  ...  6.10  ...  8.13  7.22 
Sources: Appendix B and author's estimates discussed in text. 
duration  group.  The data at the bottom  of the table  give,  first,  the average 
number  of visits  per month,  then add in unemployment  benefits,  and  then 
convert  this figure  to hours  per  week  at an assumed  duration  of two hours 
per visit. The rather  surprising  conclusion  is an average  of only about  7.2 
hours per week of search activity, or about 19 percent  of the normal 
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These estimates,  based on the Sheppard-Belitsky  study, are subject  to 
a number  of possible  biases.  Erie  has a relatively  small  metropolitan  area 
(264,000  in 1970),  and  job searchers  may visit more companies  in larger 
areas.  An opposite  bias may  be the small  proportion  of blacks  in the Erie 
population  (3 percent  in 1970); according  to Stephenson's  unpublished 
data,  black  teenagers  in Indianapolis  had only 57 percent  as many average 
weekly  contacts  with  firms  as whites.15  Another  important  limitation  of the 
Erie  survey  is the predominance  of blue-collar  workers  in the sample.  Rees 
and Shultz  present  evidence  indicating  that blue-collar  workers  are much 
more dependent  than white-collar  workers  on informal  job sources (re- 
ferral  by another  employee,  and by other  employers).16  This may explain 
why on average  they make  so few visits  to companies  or the Employment 
Service.  But while  white-collar  workers  make  more use of formal  sources, 
the major ones are newspaper  advertisements  and private employment 
agencies.  In principle  these sources  should  require  less search  time than 
visits to company  hiring  gates without  any previous  leads, because  when 
the searcher  sets out with  his want  ad or his private  agency  referral  slip in 
hand  he knows  that a job is available.  My rough  guess  is that the greater 
reliance  on formal  sources  by white-collar  workers  is balanced  out by a 
smaller  number  of visits  once a lead  is obtained  from  a want  ad or private 
agency.  Therefore  the  results  of Table  C-I will  be applied  to all unemployed 
adults  in the United  States,  both blue-  and white-collar. 
Stephenson  questioned  281 Indianapolis  unemployed  male teenagers 
about  their  search  activity.  For whites  the average  intensity  of search  was 
15. They were unemployed  about twice as long, so their total number of contacts 
was about the same. Stanley P. Stephenson,  Jr., "The Economics of Job Search: A 
Biracial  Analysis of Youth Job Search  Behavior"  (paper  presented  at the 1972 annual 
meeting  of the Econometric  Society; processed). 
16. Albert Rees and George P. Shultz, Workers  and Wages in an Urban  Labor 
Market  (University  of Chicago Press, 1970),  Table 13.1, pp. 201-02. The following are 
average  percentage  shares  of the reported  job sources  by type (rehires  and "unknown" 
are excluded): 
Four white-  Eight blue- 
Job source  collar occupations collar occupations 
Informal  referral  38.7  70.1 
Gate application  6.5  11.4 
State Employment  Service  1.8  2.3 
Private  agencies  22.2  2.6 
Newspaper  advertisements  21.7  9.1 
Other  (schools, unions)  9.3  4.4 194  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1973 
4.15 average  weekly  contacts  with  firms,  somewhat  higher  than  in the Erie 
study  of adults.  The  average  duration  of unemployment  for the white  teen- 
agers  was only  about  one month,  with  a total of about 17  visits  per  month. 
The black  teenagers  in Stephenson's  sample  made 10.3 visits  per month. 
The comparable  figure  in the Erie sample  for the adult  males  looking  for 
new  jobs who were  unemployed  less than six weeks  (Table  C-1,  column  4) 
is 9 company  visits. This discrepancy  might  be caused  either  by a higher 
intensity  of job search  by teenagers  due to the lack of employed  friends  to 
refer  them informally  to job vacancies,  by a low price of home time in 
alternative  activities,  or perhaps  by the larger  size of Indianapolis  relative 
to Erie.17 
When  the white and black  teenage  results  are weighted  by the relative 
shares  of the two groups  in U.S. teenage  unemployment,  the average  is 
15.7  visits  per month,  or almost 10 visits  more  than for adult  males,  and 
this implies  an average  of 4.9 hours  per week  of extra  search  by teenagers. 
Maintaining  the Erie result  that women search  half as much as men, a 
weighted  average  for total unemployment  that combines  the Erie adult 
results  and  the Indianapolis  teenage  results  yields  an overall  average  of 8.4 
hours  per week. 
Other  scattered  pieces  of evidence  are reasonably  consistent  with these 
estimates.  One detailed  diary study classified  individuals  as unemployed 
if they  were  "without  regular  employment."  The males  in this group  spent 
15.4  hours  per week on "work"  and an additional  3.5 hours  per week in 
"transportation."  Since some portion  was presumably  devoted  to search 
and  the remainder  to part-time  or casual  jobs, these  figures  set upper  limits 
on search  time  for the sample  because  every  hour  of the rest  of the week  is 
accounted  for in detail.18  Most of the psychological  studies  of the impact 
of unemployment  emphasize  the continued  presence  of the unemployed 
husband  at home.19  Finally,  the Wilcock-Franke  study  of plant  closings  in 
17. Stephenson  also reports asking a subsample  of 93, "How many days per week 
did you spend  looking for a job?" The mean answer  was 2.94, but this does not tell us 
the number  of hours per day. 
18. George A. Lundberg,  Mirra Komarovsky,  and Mary A. Mclnerny,  Leisure:  A 
Suburban  Study  (Columbia  University  Press, 1934),  Table 2, p. 97. 
19. "Most wives testify to the increased  irritability  and conflicts due to the man's 
presence  at home....  The husband's  share of household duties is another source of 
irritation.  Now that he is idle most of the time, how much  should he be expected  to help 
his wife?" Mirra Komarovsky,  The Unemployed  Man and His Family: The Effect of 
Unemployment  Upon  the Status of the Man in Fifty-nine  Families  (Dryden  Press, 1940), 
p. 39. Robert J. Gordon  195 
the  late  1950s reports a  search pattern consistent  with  the  Sheppard- 
Belitsky and depression evidence of  relatively intensive  search at  first, 
followed by little or no effort: 
...  for those who became  long-term  unemployed,  there  was a tendency  to stop 
making  the rounds  after a while and to rely on the hope that something  would 
turn up from companies  where applications  had been filed or to wait for the 
"grapevine"  to supply  information  that a certain  company  was hiring.  As one of 
the East St. Louis  interviewers  described  it: "When  the first  frantic  period  of job 
seeking  was over, people tended  to settle down at home, reluctant  to pound  the 
pavement  or waste  precious  dollars  driving  around  fruitlessly-hence, the heavy 
reliance  on the grapevine  and upon friends  and relatives."20 
20. Richard  C. Wilcock  and Walter  H. Franke, Unwanted  Workers:  Permanent  Lay- 
offs and  Long-term  Unemploymenit  (Free Press of Glencoe, 1963), p. 115. Comments  and 
Discussion 
William  Nordhaus:  Gordon  investigates  the extent  to which  temporary  and 
permanent  deviations  of actual  from  potential  output  have offsetting,  but 
generally  unmeasured,  costs.  The  reasoning  can be broken  into three  steps: 
1. First,  the marginal  product  of a manhour  diverges  from  the average 
gross  wage.  According  to most short-run  productivity  studies  the impact, 
short-run  (one year),  marginal  product  of a manhour  is about  two times 
the gross  wage.  The long-run  evidence  is less clear. 
2. Second,  the additional  manhours  put to work  come from  nonmarket 
activity  (for example,  leisure,  waiting,  searching,  sleeping)  that  has a lower 
value. 
3. Finally,  taxes,  commuting,  unemployment  compensation,  and so on, 
introduce  a very  large  wedge  between  gross  wage and net wage. 
The upshot is that the marginal  product  of a manhour  is, according  to 
Gordon,  about  eight  times  its social  cost in the short  run.  It is not surpris- 
ing that he concludes  that Okun's  law stands  intact  when embedded  in a 
broader  accounting  system  which  includes  the value  of unmeasured  activi- 
ties. 
I think  that  this approach  to policy  decisions  is in principle  correct.  The 
paper  does, however,  point out the great  difficulties  involved  in doing the 
theoretically  correct  calculations. 
I want  to raise  a couple  of questions  regarding  the calculations.  Gordon 
has reckoned  with the value of nonmarket  time including  leisure; but 
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while  he has included  the Fifth Dimension,  he forgets  about the fourth. 
Consider  what the "temporary  case" involves. Gordon says that in a 
"temporary"  boom (reducing  unemployment  by, say, 1 point in one year) 
the elasticity  of labor  inputs  with  respect  to output  is two-thirds,  a reason- 
ably  well-established  number.  In the next section,  he argues  on theoretical 
grounds  that when the rest of the lagged  terms are added  up, the total 
elasticity  of labor  inputs  with respect  to output  rises  to about 1.35.  Thus, 
as the lag works  out through  the years  after  the boom, the deferred  cost is 
about 0.68 unit of manhours.  Perhaps,  with discounting,  the sum of the 
current  and deferred  costs is lower  than 1.35.  If the mean  lag were  around 
two years and the discount  rate 10 percent,  the elasticity  would be 1.12 
rather  than 1.35. The result  is that unless  there  is some kind of variable 
coefficients  model, the input costs Gordon presents  should be roughly 
doubled. 
The next question  (point 3 above)  is the striking  difference  between  the 
value of output  and the value of the manhour  inputs  into output.  Recall 
from  Table  3 that the marginal  product  per manhour  is $8.57  (=  28.36/ 
3.308), while the marginal  cost is $1.14  (=  3.78/3.308).  The discrepancy 
reflects  the fact that, relative  to leisure  and unemployment  compensation, 
working,  commuting,  and paying  taxes  are an incredible  hassle. 
I am a little uneasy  about the treatment  of taxes. Gordon  uses a weird 
mixture  of neoclassical  and neo-Keynesian  economics:  He assumes  house- 
holds are good utility  maximizers  but that somehow  labor markets  and 
firms are in perpetual  disequilibrium.  The argument  revolves around 
whether  the lower  level of unemployment  he considers  is sustainable  in the 
long run at the going  prices,  interest  rates,  wages,  tax rates,  and so forth. 
If Gordon  had a world  without  uncertainty  or involuntary  unemployment, 
I think the argument  would be unacceptable.  He treats  taxes as a dead- 
weight  loss-something designed  simply  to throw  away  utility.  The  modern 
neoclassical  treatment  (following Ramsey in  1927, Boiteux, Diamond, 
Mirrlees,  and others)  is that in a well-designed  tax system,  the budgetary 
costs of public goods (perhaps  including  transfer  payments  as a public 
good) are below the true costs by just this wedge between  gross and net 
wage.  In the  long run  people  will  not increase  work  effort  without  a change 
in the real  after-tax  wage.  In the long run,  higher  tax yields  require  higher 
tax rates  and greater  distortions.  But Gordon's  world  is not this smooth 
world,  but rather  the world  described  by Tobin-stochastic supplies  and 
demands  and continuous  flux. I don't know whether  the effect  of changes 198  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1973 
in government fiscal or monetary policy in the long run looks  more like 
the Keynes-Tobin-Gordon view or more like the smooth neoclassical view. 
If the latter, then again Gordon is equating the social cost of policies with 
their impact effects, whereas he should be considering the (properly dis- 
counted) long-run effects. 
Incidentally, the modification for disutility of work that he mentions is 
not correct. As long as goods are the numeraire,  the wage already nets out 
that effect. Also,  Gordon is double-counting by adding the gross invest- 
ment in search (Table 3, line 4). 
As far as the permanent effects are concerned, Gordon has provided a 
very interesting way of looking  at the reserve army of the unemployed. 
Ignoring capital, taxes, and the rest, this is how I see the argument: Vacan- 
cies and unemployment are in a constant state of creation and decay. The 
important point is that the vacancy rate is easily modified by a firm's man- 
power policy. Every vacancy is an indication that the marginal product is 
greater than the going wage, and we could perhaps argue that a stochastic 
equilibrium would lie where the equilibrium amount of hoarded labor- 
the precautionary demand-would  be such that at normal unemployment 
rates (u) and vacancy rates (v) the wage would equal the average cost of a 
vacancy. If policy engendered an extra vacancy, the net marginal output 
forgone per unit change in the vacancy rate would be zero. Given this 
calculation, it is hard to see how Gordon arrives at his figures for the costs 
of a vacancy. 
The argument for the costs of unemployment are also problematical. As 
I noted above, it is not proper to add to income the individual's imputation 
to the value of search: This is like gross investment. The only true costs of a 
lower unemployment rate are the drain of time from other utility-yielding 
activities, such as leisure, do-it-yourself projects, and so on. All of these 
considerations make one reluctant  to take the Beveridge relation between u 
and v as stable over time, as Gordon must do. 
Gordon seems unusually wary about using the actual numbers for va- 
cancies and unemployment for determining the optimal rate. For Britain, 
which assiduously collects such statistics, the Beveridge point (calculated 
as N"-v) was about 1.2 percent until the recent unemployment insurance 
and other reforms, then rose to 1.5 for 1972. (I ignore differences  in defini- 
tion of unemployment.) For U.S. manufacturing  (the only sector for which 
vacancy data are available), the Beveridge  point for 1969-72 was about 2.0 
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the national average, the national Beveridge point might be around 1.8 
percent. According to Gordon, the optimal unemployment rate would be 
around 1.0 percent. It is instructive to note that the United Kingdom has 
operated at an average  rate 1.5 times its "optimum," while the U.S. average 
is closer to 3 times its "optimum." 
WilliamPoole: I am in general agreement  with Bob Gordon's analysis, but 
feel that certain points deserve greater emphasis. For the purposes of my 
discussion I will assume that the natural unemployment rate hypothesis is 
correct, at least above some threshold inflation rate. And rather than the 
natural rate of unemployment, I prefer to talk of the natural rate of non- 
employment or, what is equivalent, the natural rate of employment. 
First assume that the economy has settled down to equilibrium growth 
at the natural rate of employment. In such a situation there are three types 
of nonemployment. The first type arises from the labor-leisure choice, the 
second from job search, and the third from labor market imperfections. 
In long-run equilibrium, measured unemployment reflects in part the 
fact that some people work in industries subject to seasonal and random 
influences, but nevertheless may be considered fully employed. Many such 
workers average 40 hours per week over time through a combination of, 
say, 60-hour weeks and unemployed weeks. While some people are surely 
trapped in undesirable  jobs with fluctuating employment, others, such as 
farmers  with seasonal crops and Brookings panel members who must work 
overtime to meet publication deadlines, obviously choose such  jobs volun- 
tarily. 
Search unemployment  arises from  the  continual  micro  adjustments 
within the macro equilibrium. Micro disequilibrium reflects the realloca- 
tion of resources in response to ongoing supply and demand shifts. Search 
unemployment settles down, in principle, to  an optimum in the macro 
equilibrium. People refuse some jobs in order to search for others that are 
more rewarding  in both a personal and a pecuniary sense. Search is a pro- 
ductive activity in that worker satisfactions and total  output, taken to- 
gether, are maximized when individuals search long enough to make the 
best possible match between employee and employer. 
The third form of nonemployment at the natural rate of nonemployment 
stems from imperfections such as the minimum wage, information external- 
ities in the labor market, union monopoly  power, and firm monopsony 
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distortion of the labor-leisure choice by the personal income tax. While 
some of these imperfections can and should be corrected, the cost of cor- 
recting others may be greater than the benefit. The income tax, for exam- 
ple, has certain advantages over alternative taxes. 
Gordon's equation (9) is a mathematical statement of this analysis. An 
alternative mathematical statement, obtained by using Gordon's identity 
(10) instead of the identity Q  qM, is given by 
(9a)  dZ_  -Qd  +  dT+  Md(w/pQ) 
de  pz  Lde  de  de 
(  w-wuX  dU  w-  WN  dN1 
VPQ  /  de  PQ  /dej 
In the long run it can be assumed that dK/de =  dT/de  0, since the capi- 
tal stock is adjusted to the amount of employment and tax rates are ad- 
justed to yield the optimal amount of revenues. However, M[d(w/pQ)]/de 
is positive, reflecting  the labor-leisure distortion from the income tax, and 
so dZ/de is also positive. 
For the moment, let us interpret w, wu, and WN as economy-wide aver- 
ages. The  natural-rate hypothesis is  simply that market forces tend to 
equate w, wu, and WN and that these forces are independent of the rate of 
inflation in the long run. Without attempting to argue the validity of this 
view, I do want to emphasize that there exists an unemployment rate low 
enough such that (w -  wu)  and (w -  wN) both become negative. This situa- 
tion can occur during a period of generalized excess demand as a result of 
adjustment lags. For  example, some union  contracts provide for  com- 
pulsory overtime, which is acceptable to workers unless it is invoked re- 
peatedly during a period of excess demand. 
What all this means is that above the natural rate of employment addi- 
tional employment is a "bad" rather than a "good." Above the natural 
rate it is incorrect to speak of a tradeoff between unemployment and infla- 
tion. Individuals have too little leisure, on average, and they search for too 
short a period when unemployed. Some individuals and firms suffer a loss 
of productivity from supply shortages. Family and health problems caused 
by excessive hours of work are no less real than those arising from too little 
work. While it is true that excessive hours of work seem more easily avoided 
than deficient hours, many find that a long-run career demands excessively 
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Gordon's approach recasts the standard unemployment-inflation trade- 
off argument  by introducing the concept of an optimal rate of employment. 
This is an open invitation to examine the costs of overfull employment, 
instead of pursuing the tradeoff approach, which invites examination of the 
costs of inflation. 
Gordon's empirical work has concentrated on the unemployed. Equa- 
tion (9) is applied not to economy-wide averages for w, wu, and wv but 
rather to averages for the unemployed. That w exceeds wN by a substantial 
margin for the unemployed should not be surprising; after all, an individ- 
ual for whom this condition was not satisfied would have no incentive to 
look for work. But in calculating the gains from reducing unemployment 
Gordon has made no attempt to measure the increase in WN for those em- 
ployed in the initial situation. At least in the temporary case it must be true 
that (w -  WN)  and (w -  wu) become negative for some workers. There are 
costs as well as benefits to overfull employment. 
Gordon's calculations may be interpreted as attempting to measure the 
possible gains from micro policies that succeeded in reducing the unem- 
ployment rate by 1 percentage point. The gains would be larger than he 
estimates to the extent that these same policies improved productivity in 
labor-short industries and reduced strains on the overemployed. 
Gordon's calculations should not, I believe, be interpreted as measuring 
possible gains from macro policies that reduce unemployment by 1 per- 
centage point. These calculations ignore the costs of overemployment. I 
haven't the foggiest idea how important these costs are at 5 percent unem- 
ployment, but I am convinced that as a matter of economic principle there 
must be an unemployment rate low enough that these costs would become 
important. 
Gordon's  neoclassical approach  seems  to  require acceptance  of  the 
natural-rate  hypothesis, but for good reason he does not want to entangle 
his paper in the natural-rate debate. He should not, however, justify his 
discussion of the permanent case as an attempt to measure the costs of 
pursuing macro policies aiming for 5 percent rather than 4 percent unem- 
ployment. Those who believe the natural-rate hypothesis do not typically 
advocate such an approach to policy. The natural rate of employment is 
not known, and it surely changes over time in response to demographic 
shifts, structural  changes in the economy, and changes in the micro policies 
of  government. Accordingly,  the  policy  prescription should be  for  the 
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zone is reached. If this argument is correct, the economy will then slowly 
gravitate toward the natural rate, whatever it may be. 
Discussion 
R. A. Gordon voiced the concern of several participants  that the attempt 
to "price" the various components of an individual's time can be carried 
too far. Lawrence Klein added that the value of those factors related to 
unemployment, which are at best imperfectly computed in the paper, are 
outweighed by many other enormous costs. Valuing a man's time in terms 
of certain social costs and market wages overlooks the much more serious 
problem posed by the uneven incidence of unemployment. For with unem- 
ployment concentrated among groups such as teenagers and blacks, the 
long-run costs of social instability will certainly overshadow the relatively 
low wage value of their time. 
Charles Holt pointed out that the people most involved in the job search 
process are those at the very low end of the income distribution scale. A 
slack labor market would be particularly  injurious to this group. Holt felt 
that this question of income distribution should somehow have been more 
directly integrated into  Gordon's formal analytical framework. He  also 
was concerned that the psychic costs of unemployment were not more fully 
discussed in the paper. Many people experience  job search as an anxiety- 
filled and painful experience,  yet this dimension is not captured  in Gordon's 
analysis or calculations. Holt also questioned whether the average duration 
of job  search was an adequate measure of the situation the unemployed 
confront. The distribution of spell duration is highly skewed, with a sizable 
number of workers experiencing very long spells of unemployment. Unem- 
ployed workers confront this risk; hence, risk aversion would have been a 
valuable addition to the analysis of search behavior. 
Responding to these arguments,  R. J. Gordon agreed  that, apart  from his 
adjustment for the psychic costs  of  unemployment for adult males,  his 
analysis did not take account of psychic costs or income distribution effects. 
Nevertheless, he felt that analysis of these nonquantifiable  costs should rest 
on some measure  of the aggregate social costs involved and of a related opti- 
mum unemployment rate. Referring to Holt's comment on risk aversion, 
Gordon  reported the  somewhat  paradoxical finding  of  the  Sheppard- 
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as intensely as do the rest of the unemployed. This suggests that risk aver- 
sion plays an important role in the search process; even if the chance of 
recall is 80 percent, people will generally not risk indefinite unemployment 
by completely abstaining from search. Instead, they are apt to shop around 
and at least file job applications with other firms. Okun noted that, in con- 
trast to his comments, Gordon's formal model assumes that those expect- 
ing recall refrain from search, and that this assumption complicates the 
algebraic development of the model. 
Gordon also responded to several criticisms raised in Nordhaus' formal 
discussion. He insisted that he had not treated taxes as a deadweight loss; 
the extra dollars of tax revenue generated at a lower unemployment rate 
were valued exactly the same as the extra dollars of private after-tax in- 
come, without regard to the uses made of that tax revenue. Second, he 
argued that Nordhaus' "fourth dimension" of deferred manhours would 
not necessarily apply after a temporary boom-for  example, if the produc- 
tivity bonus reflected peak capacity. Finally, he reiterated that the social 
costs of vacancies should include an allowance for their costs to consumers. 
Other assumptions involved in  Gordon's  analysis of  the  "temporary 
case" were also questioned by panel members. Saul Hymans observed that 
although Gordon posits a functional relationship  between y, the acceptance 
wage, and x, the expected wage, there is also causation running from y to x. 
Hyman Kaitz cautioned that many people who are entitled to unemploy- 
ment compensation either do not claim their benefits at all or withdraw  from 
the labor force for a while and then return, at which time they claim com- 
pensation benefits. This type of behavior would tend to increase the social 
costs attached to search time. R. A. Gordon noted that the marginal utility 
of home time, WN, should decline as the duration of unemployment length- 
ens. The leisure time available the first week of unemployment might be 
welcome, but as time passed, it would be increasingly  less so, and for many 
people would doubtlessly become a severe burden before long. 
Referring to another of Gordon's assumptions, Okun pointed out that 
the price of search time should decline as the unemployment rate increases. 
Since the probability of finding a job  is lower when the labor market is 
weak, the acceptance wage should be lower during such periods. Therefore, 
the same factors that are responsible for a lower acceptance wage at high 
unemployment levels should also reduce the value of search time at those 
levels. For this reason, Okun argued, it would be incorrect to use the price 
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search time of the unemployed when the rate is pushed to 5 percent. The 
increment of search time might thus have zero or negative value rather 
than the positive value assigned it by Gordon. 
The "permanent  case" analyzed by Gordon generated considerable con- 
troversy, particularly his contention that only a small output or welfare 
bonus could be expected in the long run from a reduction in the unemploy- 
ment rate. The main concern was with Gordon's three assumptions about 
vacancies that led him to estimate a productivity decline at lower unem- 
ployment rates: (1) that vacancies increase as much as unemployment de- 
clines in the 4 to 5 percent unemployment region; (2) that one-fourth of 
these additional vacancies cannot be foreseen; and (3) that the social cost 
of these unforeseen vacancies is equal to  the wage of the job  involved. 
The effect of these assumptions was to take away about one-third of the 
additional output that would have come from the additional manhours of 
work at the lower unemployment rate. This contrasts with the temporary 
case in which a substantial productivity bonus  adds to the output associated 
with additional manhours. 
George Perry questioned the first two assumptions. He pointed out that 
we know nothing at all about what fraction of vacancies are unforeseen. 
This unmeasurable number could be substantially smaller than the one- 
fourth that Gordon assumed and thus cut the estimated productivity loss 
from this source to a small fraction of Gordon's estimate. Offering  a range 
of values and corresponding productivity estimates seemed the only way 
to deal with such an unknown quantity. Perry also pointed out that avail- 
able evidence on vacancies suggests a much smaller absolute increase in 
their number than Gordon assumes for the 4 to 5 percent unemployment 
region. He noted that the point at which the increment in vacancies corre- 
sponds to  the increment in unemployment has always been thought to 
come at much lower unemployment rates, as Nordhaus' discussion had 
pointed out. 
Hyman Kaitz remarked that job vacancy statistics in the United States 
are generally considered to reflect somewhat lower vacancy levels than are 
suspected actually to exist, and that it was hard to guess what value was 
appropriate to Gordon's calculation. R.A. Gordon agreed and questioned 
whether Nordhaus, in his comments, was justified in comparing the British 
and American vacancy experiences. R.  J. Gordon added that the much 
higher teenage and female turnover rates in the United States make the 
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sufficiently  sensitive to detect the high vacancy rates that may exist in the 
service areas, for  example, and that high unemployment rates there are 
also  balanced by  high  vacancy rates, making  the  manufacturing data 
inapplicable. 
Okun objected to Gordon's procedure of equating the price of a vacancy 
with the marginal product of an additional worker, reiterating Nordhaus' 
concern with that calculation. Ignoring extreme cases like Gordon's super- 
market or an integrated production process where a missing man could 
force an assembly-line  shutdown, Okun and Hall agreed that a vacancy has 
value only to the extent that it produces surplus. In that case, since a mar- 
ginal worker's contribution to surplus is usually far exceeded by his real 
wage, Okun submitted that the cost of vacancies in Gordon's analysis is 
substantially overstated. He  did  not  believe the  inconvenience to  con- 
sumers  cited by Gordon should much change the aggregate  estimate arrived 
at by looking at producers' surplus since producers take account of this in 
competing for customers. Moreover, in goods as opposed to services, the 
role of finished goods inventories as a buffer holds down the cost  of  a 
vacancy to both the seller and the customer. 
In reply, R. J. Gordon expanded on the arguments offered in his paper. 
Describing a world in which the economy has been pushed to a low unem- 
ployment rate, he pointed to the fact that a vacancy causes inconvenience 
not only to the employer who is attempting to fill it, but also to the pro- 
ducer who finds his orders being shipped later than he expected and to the 
customer who must tolerate longer waiting lines. He agreed that the social 
cost of a vacancy was hard to guess; his supermarket example suggested 
that the cost could be much larger than the wage of the additional worker, 
but in other cases it might be smaller. His major aim in the paper had been 
to offer a conceptual framework into which readers could substitute their 
guesses when they differed from his. 
In a concluding comment, William Fellner questioned the validity of 
calculating an optimal unemployment rate based on a crude comparison 
of aggregate vacancies and unemployed persons. Since, as the economy 
nears such an optimum, vacancies can represent demands for very specific 
kinds of workers, it is difficult to distinguish a precise point of optimality 
based on aggregate vacancy data alone. 